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ARTIC LE 
PU NISHING DRUG ADDICTS \VHO 1.-L--\VE BABIES : 
\VOMEN OF COLOE. EQUALI T Y, 
AND THE EIGHT OF PRIVACY 
Dorothr E. Hoberts"" 
Women increasingly face crililinal charges for giv ing birth to infants ·who 
test positive for drugs. Most of the :oo men pmsecul eci are poor, Black, and 
addic ted to crack cocaine. hz this ,lrti cle, Profe ssor R ob erts seeics to add 
the penpective of poor Black women to the current debate o·<}er prot ecting 
fetal r ights at th e expense of women's righ ts. Based 0 11 th e presumption tlzat 
Black women experience se<.1 eral fonn s of oppress ion simultaneously, the 
author argues that the punishment of drug addic ts ·wlzo ch oose to carry th eir 
pregnancies to term violates their constitutional right s to equal pyotection 
and pri11acy regarding their repmdu cti <H choices Sh e begins by placing 
these prosecutions in th e context of the /zistori ca l de<.>aluation of B lacl? 1.oomen 
as motheYs. After presenting lz er view of th e prosecutio ns as punishing drug-
addicted women for having babies, the author argues that th is pm<ishmeni 
~~iolates the equ al protectio n clause beca us e it stenls fmm and perpetuates 
Black subo·rdinat ion . Finally, Profes so r Roberts argues that the prose cutions 
<>iolate women's constitu tional rights to az!IOiiOiiiY and fr ee dom f rom inc•i d-
ious gm,emment standards fov childb eari ;.- _~ . liz jJrcs cnfing f1e r ·uiew that t!ze 
pmsecutions v io late womeu's pri<•acy rig,!tts, til e auth or r.ritiques the lib eral, 
"negat ive'' conception of privacy roo ted in f rN dom .f!·om go"i.:enmzent co n-
straints. Size concludes by ad~>o cat in g a progressiL>e concept of pri1.,acy !hat 
pla ces an affi rmatiw obligation u;z t i; e gow m men t to gu arant ee iniii'uid ual 
rights and recognizes the Cvlll lecl ion hel<.i •t en the right of prh•acy ,1/ld racial 
equality . 
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Prologue 
Aformer slave named Lizzie Wi lliams recounted the beaiing of preg-nant slave women on a A1ississippi cotton plantation: "I[']s seen 
nigger women dat ·was fixin' to be confined do some thin' de white folks 
didn't lik e. Dey [the white folks J would dig a hole in de ground just 
big 'nuff fa' her stomach, make her li e face down an whip h er' on de 
back to keep fi'om hurtin' de child ."1 
In July rg8g , Jennifer Clarise Johnson, a twenty-three-year-old 
crack addict, became the first woman in the United States to be 
criminally convicted for exposing her baby to drugs while pregnant. z 
F lorida law enforcement officials charged Johnson with two counts of 
delivering a controlled substance to a minor after her two children 
tested positive for cocaine at birth. Because the relevant Florida drug 
law did not apply to fetuses, 3 the prosecution invented a novel inter-
pretation of the statute. The prosecution obtained ] ohnson's convic-
tion for passing a cocaine metabolite from her body to her newborn 
infants during the sixty-second period after birth and before the um-
bilical cord was cut. 4 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A growing number of women across the country have been charged 
with criminal offenses after giving birth to babies vvho test positive 
1 Johnson, Smothered Slave Injalll s .· W ere Slac' e lvlothen at Fclldt? , 47 ].S. HrsT. 493, 5 I3 
(Ig8I). 
2 See State v. Johnson , 0/o. E8g-8go-CFA, slip op. at 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July IJ , I989), ajj'd, 
No. Sg-1765 , I99I Fla. App. LEXIS 3583 (F !a Dist. CL. App. Apr. IS, 199 1); Moss, Substance 
Abuse During Pregnancy, 1.3 HAR\'. WOMEN's LJ. 278 , :So-8-1- (Iggo); Roberts, Dru g-Add icted 
Women Who Have Babies . Tr.:IAL, :\pr. 1990, at 56, 56; Da\·idson , Newborn Drug Exposure 
Conviction a 'Drastic' Fi•·s t., L.A. Times, July ,:; r. I989, pt. I, at I, coL r. T he recent a ffirmance 
of the 1 ohnson decision by a Florida appe als court m <!rked the first t ime that a state a ppeals 
court has upheid such a conYictio n unde r laws desi gned to punish the dis tribution of drugs to 
children under I 3. See N.Y. T imes, ;\p r. 2 0, I99 I, at 6, col. 4· 
Since Johnson's convi ction. several oth er women have bee n charged with crimes for giv ing 
birth to crac k-exposed infants. Se e, e.g., State \'. Grubbs, No. 4fA-SS9--fiS Crimina l (Alaska 
Sup. Ct. Au g. 2:; , I9il9) (~e n tencing a 23 -ye::; r-old white woman tiJ si:' months in jail and five 
years probation for criminal ly ;J egl ige nt homicide in the deat h of her two-week-oid son) ; State 
v. Black, No . 89-5 325 (F la. C ir. Ct. J an . .3, I990) (oe ntencing a 32 -y.oar-old Black \Vornan to 
18 months in jail and 3 ~·e:us probation for distribution of drugs to a minor); State v. VVelch , 
No. go-CR-oo6 (Ky. Cir. Ct. i\Iarch 15, l C)90 ) (sentenci ng a 3.3-year-old w hite woman to jail for 
child abuse). See generally Paltrow (:" Shcnde. State by State C:se Summary of C riminc.l 
Prosecutions Aga inst Preg na n t Women and Appendi x of Pu blic Heal th and Pu b li c Interest 
Groups Opposed to Th ese Prosecutions, Oc t. : g. r 990 (unpulJlishcd memo randum to ACLU 
Affiliates a nd Inter.:sted Pa rties) (on til e at t he H an· arcl L:r,' School Librar:-' ) [hereinafter State 
Case Summaryj. 
3 Sec F LA. STAT . . c\ l\':o-:. § 893 . r .)(:Hc) (\ifesl. :Oup p . i9C)OI. 
-l See T ri al Transc ri pt at 2 0 - 2 4. Si-6o . 5ta!t.: ~ ~ . Jolutson lh:.~n::inafter Tria! 1~ranscript-l 
(testirnon\· of D rs. Randy Ton1pkins :~nd M itchell Ped ~t ei n). 
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for drugs. 5 T he majority of these women, like Jennifer Johnson, are 
poor and Black. 6 Most are addicted to crack cocaine. 7 The prose-
cution of drug-addicted mothers is part of an alarming trend towards 
greater state intervention into the lives of pregnant women under the 
rationale of protecting the fetus from harm. 8 This intervention has 
included compelled medical treatment, greater restrictions on abortion, 
and increased supervision of pregnant women's conduct. 
5 Since I 98 7, at least so so-called "fetal a buse" cases have been brought in I 9 sta tes and the 
District of Columbia. See Hoffman , Pregnant, A ddic ted - And Gu ilty?, N. Y. T imes, Aug. 
I9, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 32, 35; se e also Lewin , Drug Use in Pregnancy : New I ss ue for the 
Courts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1990, at Aq, col. r (reporting that "[p]rosecutors nationwide are 
putting . . drug laws to new use to deal with th e ra pidly growin g number of [d rug-exposed] 
babies"); M cNamara , Fetal Endangerment Cases on th e Rise, Boston Globe , Oct . J, I989, at 
r, col. 2 (noting that ro new "fetal endangerment" cases had been brought nationwide in the 
three months followin g the Supreme Court's decision in \Vebster v. Reproductive H ealth Servs., 
109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989)). 
Several courts have recently dismissed such "fetal abuse" cases . See, e.g., People v. H ardy, 
No. r2845 8, 1991 Mich. App. LEXIS I35 (f..,!ich Ct. App. Apr. r, 199I); Judge Drops Charges 
of Delivering Drugs to an Unborn Baby , N.Y. Times, Feb. s, 199 1, at Bli, col. 4· 
6 According to a memorandum prepa red by th e ACLll Reproductin: Freedom Project, of 
the 52 defendants, 35 are African-American, 14 are white, 2 are Latina, and 1 is N a tive 
American. S ee State Case Summary, sup1·a note 2; Telephone interviews wi th Jose ph M erkin, 
Attorney for Sharon Peters (J a n . 7, 1991 ), J::tmes Shields, North Carolina AC LU (Ja n. 7, 1991) . 
and Patrick Young, Attorney for Brenda Yurchak (Jan. 7, 1991); see also Kol ata, Bias Seen 
Against Pregnant Addicts, N.Y. Times, July 20, r 990, at A 13, col. I (ind icating that of 6o 
women charged, So% were min orities). The dispropo rtionate prosecution of poor Black wo men 
can be see n most clearly in th e sta tes that have ini tiated the most cases. In Florida, whe re two 
women hav e been convicted for distributing dru gs to a min or, 10 out of I 1 crimina l cases were 
brought against Black women. See State Case Sum mary, supra note 2, at 3-5. Similarly, of 
18 women in South Carolina cha rged since August 1989 w ith either criminal negl ect of a chiid 
or distribution of dru gs to a minor, r 7 have been Black. See id. at r 2. 
; See Hoffman, supra note 5, at 35 (noting that '·w ith the exce ption of a fe w cases, p rosecutors 
have not go ne after pregnant a lcoholics"). 
8 In addition to prosecuting women afte r the birth of a baby for pre na tal crimes, t he ran ge 
of state intrusions on pregnant women 's a utonom y includes j a iling pregnant wom en, se e infra 
notes 54-5 6 and accompanying text; placin g the child in protective custody, see N.J. REv. STAT . 
§ 30AC-r 1 (West 1981); allowing tort suits by children against th eir mothers for negli gent cond uct 
during pregnancy, see Grodin v. Grod in , 102 Mich .. \ pp. 396, .)O l N.W.2 d 869 (r98o); ordering 
forced medical tre atment performed on pregna.nt wome n, see in re A,. C., 57 3 A. 2d r 2 35 (D . C. 
1990) ; depriving mothers of child custody based on ac ts during wegnancy, see infm notes -t8-
53 a nd accompanying text; upholdin g empl oyer policies exclud ing fertile women fro m the work-
place, see llAW v. J ohnson Cont rols, In c., 886 F. 2d 8 71 (7 th Cir. 1989), rev 'd, III S. Ct. IJ96 
(1991); and placing greate r restrictions on access to abo rtion , see Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Sen ·s . , 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). For general th eoretical t reatments of th e issues in volved in state 
interven tion during p regnan cy, see Gallagher, Preuata! ln<casions & lntnwntions: What's H'm;zg 
w ith Fetal Rights, ro HARV. Wo!I!EN 'S L. J. 9 ( 198 7l; Go ldberg, Jhdiwi Cho ices D zo·ing 
Pregnancy: Whose Decision I s I t Anyway? , 41 RuTGE RS L. REv . 59 I ( 1989); McN ulty, P reg-
na ncy P olice: The H ealth P olicy and L egal i mplications of Punishing Pregnal!i l·Vomenfor Hann 
to Th eir Fetuses, I6 N .Y. U. R EV . L. & Soc. CHANG E 177 . 279-90 (1988) ; a nd N ote, T lu: 
C;·eation of Fetal Rights: Conflic ts witlz !Vomen's Cous tllutional Rights to Liberty, Priw!cy, and 
Equal Protec tion, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (rg86) . 
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Such government intrusion is particularly harsh for poor women 
of color. 9 They are the least likely to obtain adequate prenatal care , 
the most vulnerable to government monitoring, and the least able to 
conform to the white, middle-class standard of motherhood. They are 
therefore the primary targets of government control. 
The prosecution of drug-addicted mothers implicates two funda-
mental tensions. First, punishing a woman for using drugs during 
pregnancy pits the state's interest in protecting the future health of a 
child against the mother's interest in autonomy over her reproductive 
life - interests that until recently had not been thought to be in 
conflict. Second, such prosecutions represent one of two possible 
responses to the problem of drug-exposed babies. The government 
may choose either to help women have healthy pregnancies or to 
punish women for their prenatal conduct. 10 Although it might seem 
that the state could pursue both of these avenues at once, the two 
responses are ultimately irreconcilable. Far from deterring injurious 
drug use, prosecution of drug-addicted mothers in fact deters pregnant 
women from using available health and counseling services because it 
causes women to fear that, if they seek help, they could be reported 
to government authorities and charged with a crime. 11 Moreover, 
prosecution blinds the public to the possibility of nonpunitive solutions 
and to the inadequacy of the nonpunitive solutions that are currently 
available. 12 
T he debate between those who favor protecting the rights of the 
fetus and those who favor protecting the rights of the mother has 
been extensively waged in the literature. 13 This Article does not repeat 
9 I use the term "wome n of color" to refer to non-white women in America, including Black, 
Latina, Asian, and N ative American women. Recog nizing the diversity of histori cal and cultural 
backgrounds amon g women of color, this Articl e focu ses particularly on the experience of Black 
women in America. \Vh en women of color are united in a commo n experience of oppression 
and po\·erty, however, I draw more ge neral conclusions about constraints on their reprod uc tive 
autonom:y. 
10 In 1990, lawmakers in 34 states debated bill s co ncernin g prenatal substa nce abuse. S ee 
K ey Battie in War on Drugs: Saving Pregnant vVomen, Endangered Babies, State Health Notes, 
June 1990, at r, col. t (published by the George Washington Un ive rsity Intergove rnmen tal 
Health Policy Project). In California a lone , about 20 different bill s relating to the problem of 
drug use during pregnancy were pending before th e legislatu re as of June 1989. See Marcotte , 
C,-ime and Pregnancy, A.B. A. ]. , Aug. r 989, at 14, q. 
II See inj)'a notes rs6-157 and accompanying text. 
1' Sec infm notes 87- 89 and accompanying text. 
13 For arguments suppo rti ng the mother 's right to autonomy, sec so urces cited in note S. 
For arguments advocat ing protect ion of the fetu s, see K ing , Th e Juridical Status of /.he Fet.u.>: 
A Proposal for Legal Proted ion of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. R Ev. 1647, r6S2-84 (1979); Parness 
& Prit chard, To Be or Not to B e: PYolecting th e Unborn's Pot ential ity of Life, 5 1 U . CIN. L. 
REV. 257, 267-86 (1982); Robertson, Procreatil'C Liberty and th e Con tYol of Conception, Preg-
nancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L REV. 405 , 437- 43 (1983); Walker & Puzder, State Protection 
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the theoretical arguments for and against state intervention. Rather, 
this Article suggests that both sides of the debate have largely over-
looked a critical aspect of government prosecution of drug-addicted 
mothers . Can we determine the legality of the prosecutions simply by 
weighing the state's abstract interest in the fetus against the mother's 
abstract interest in autonomy? Can we determine whether the pros-
ecutions are fair simply by deciding the duties a pregnant woman 
owes to her fetus and then assessing whether the defendant has met 
them? Can we determine the constitutionality of the government's 
actions without considering the race of the women being singled out 
for prosecution? 
Before deciding whether the state's interest in preventing harm to 
the fetus justifies criminal sanctions against the mother, we must first 
understand the mother's competing perspective and the reasons for 
the state's choice of a punitive response. This Article seeks to illu-
minate the current debate by examining the experiences of the class 
of women who are primarily affected - poor Black women. 
Providing the perspective of poor Black women offe rs two advan-
tages. First , examining legal issues from the viewpoint of those whom 
they affect most14 helps to uncover the real reasons for state action 
and to explain the real harms that it causes. It exposes the way in 
which the prosecutions deny poor Black women a facet of their hu-
manity by punishing their reproductive choices. The government's 
choice of a punitive response perpetuates the historical devaluation of 
Black women as mothers. Viewing th e legal issues from the exper-
of the Unborn After R oe v . Wade: A Legislative Proposal , 13 STETSON L. R Ev. 237 , 253 -63 
( I 984) . 
14 A growing body of sc hola rship chall enges domina nt-grou p scholars ' claims to neut ra lity 
or universali ty. This new sc hol a rship is founded on the reali ty of oppression . S ee M atsuda, 
Public R esponse to R ac ist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story , 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 
2323-2 6 ( 1989) (desc ribi ng "outside r j ur isprudence"); West , Progressi<.>e and Conservative Con-
stitutionalism , 83 M rc H. L. R Ev. 64I , 678-82 , 684- 86 (I 990) (describi ng "idealistic " a nd "anti-
su bordination progressives"). Feminist legal theo ry is perh a ps th e most established exam p le of 
thi s a lternative jurispr ud ence. See , e.g. , M acKin non , Feminism, lvf arx ism, 1lfe th od , and the 
State : Toward Feminist J misprudence , 8 SIGNS 635 (!983); Scales , The Emergence of Feminist 
J urispru de nce: A n Ess ay , 95 YALE L.J. I3 7 3 (I 986); West , Ju rispru dence and Gender , 55 U. 
CHI. L. REv . r (r988). 
T he sc h ola rshi p of people of color is a more rece nt var iety of a lte rn ative j urisp rudence. See, 
e.g., D . BELL , AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); Coo k , Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The 
R econstructive Theo logy of D1·. lvl artin Luther K ing, J r., 103 H ARv. L. R Ev. 985 (1990); 
C rens haw, Race, R eform, and Ret renchment : Transformation and Legitimation in A nt idis-
crimination Law , 101 HARv. L. REv. 133 1 (1988). Among this la tter grou p a re sc hola rs w ho , 
ii ke me, a re particu larly concerned with th e lega l prob lems an d concre te experiences of Black 
wome n . Their wo rk has in for med a nd in sp ired me. See , e .g., Austin , S apphire Bound' , 1989 
W rs. L. R Ev. 53 9; Harr is, R ace and Ess entia lism in Fe minis t Legal Th eory, 42 STAN. L. REv . 
.=;Sr (1990); Scales-T rent , B lack Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, A sse rtin g Our 
R ights , 24 HARV . C. R. -C. L L. REv. 9 (!989). 
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iential standpoint of the defendants enhances our understanding of 
the constitutional dimensions of the state's conduct. 15 
Second, examining the constraints on poor Black women's repro-
ductive choices expands our understanding of reproductive freedom 
in particular and of the right of privacy in general. Much of the 
literature discussing reproductive freedom has adopted a white middle-
class perspective, which focuses narrowly on abortion rights. The 
feminist critique of privacy doctrine has also neglected many of the 
concerns of poor women of color. 16 
My analysis presumes that Black women experience various forms 
of oppression simultaneously, 17 as a complex interaction of race, gen-
der, and class that is more than the sum of its parts. 18 It is impossible 
to isolate any one of the components of this oppression or to separate 
the experiences that are attributable to one component from experi-
ences attributable to the others. The prosecution of drug-addicted 
mothers cannot be explained as simply an issue of gender 
inequality. Poor Black women have been selected for punishment as 
a result of an inseparable combination of their gender, race, and 
economic status. Their devaluation as mothers, which underlies the 
prosecutions, has its roots in the unique experience of slavery and has 
been perpetuated by complex social forces. 
Thus, for example, the focus of mainstream feminist legal thought 
on gender as the primary locus of oppression often forces women of 
color to fragment their experience in a way that does not reflect the 
reality of their lives. 19 Angela Harris and others have presented a 
IS For a description and critique of feminist standpoint epistemology, see Bartlett, Feminist 
Legal A1 ethods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 82 9, 87 2-77 ( r 990). Bartlett criticizes feminist standpoint 
epistemology because it tends to standardize women's characteristics, it denies the significance 
of the viewpoints of non-victims, it does not explain di fferences of perception among women, 
and it engenders adversarial politics. See id. at 873-75. These criticisms have merit. ?'Jot-
withstanding the problems inherent in adopting a general feminist standpoint epistemology, I 
believe there is value in the limited project of focusing on the perspective of Black women, 
especially because that perspective has traditionally been ignored. 
16 See infra notes 197-214, 248-25 7 and accompanyine text. 
17 See Harris, supra note q, at 604 ("Far more for black women than for white women, 
the experience of self is precisely that of being unable to disentangle the web of race and gender 
-of being enmeshed always in multiple, often contradictory, discourses of sexuality and color''); 
Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, ! 2 HARV. WOMEN 'S L.J. rrs, !2! (!989); 
Scales-Trent, supra note q, at 9· The theme of the simultaneity of multiple forms of oppression 
is common in Black feminist writings. See, e.g., Combahee River Collective, A Black Feminist 
Statement, in THIS BRIDGE CALLED l\!Iy BACK: WRITINGS BY R'\DICAL WOMEN OF COLOR 
210, 213 (C. Moraga & G. Anzaldua eels. rg8r); B. HooKs , AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK Wo:VIEN 
AND FEMINISM r 2 ( r 981) ("[A]t the moment of my birth, two factors determined my destiny, 
my having been born black and my having been born female.''). 
18 See Scales-Trent, supra note q , at 9 & n. 2 (noting that "race and sex interact to magnify 
the effect of each independently''). 
!9 Angela Harris notes the fragmentation produced by an arithmetic approach to multiple 
oppression "The result of essentialism is to reduce the lives of people who experience multiple 
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racial critique of this gender essentialism in feminist legal theory. 20 
By introducing the voices of Black women, these critics have begun 
to reconstruct a feminist jurisprudence based on the historical, eco-
nomic, and social diversity of women's experiences. 21 This new ju-
risprudence must be used to reconsider the more particular discourse 
of reproductive rights. 
This Article advances an account of the constitutionality of pros-
ecutions of drug-addicted mothers that explicitly considers the expe-
riences of poor Black women. The constitutional arguments are based 
on theories of both racial equality and the right of privacy. I argue 
that punishing drug addicts who choose to carry their pregnancies to 
term unconstitutionally burdens the right to autonomy over reproduc-
tive decisions. Violation of poor Black women's reproductive rights 
helps to perpetuate a racist hierarchy in our society. The prosecutions 
thus impose a standard of motherhood that is offensive to principles 
of both equality and privacy. This Article provides insight into the 
particular and urgent struggle of women of color for reproductive 
freedom. Further, I intend my constitutional critique of the prose-
forms of oppression to add it ion problems: ' racism + sexism = straight black women's experience 
.. "' Harris, supra note 14, at 588. 
White feminist scholars do not completely ignore diversity among women. Catharine 
MacKinnon, for example, acknowledges the experiences of women of color and recognizes that 
feminist theory must take race into account. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON , FEMINISM UNrviODIFIED 
2 (I987) ("[G]ender . appears partly to comprise the meaning of, as well as bisect, race and 
class, even as race and class specificities make up, as well as cross-cut, gender."). 
20 Professor Harris defines gender essentialism as "the notion that a unitary, 'essential' 
women's experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, 
and other realities of experience." Harris, supra note 14, at 585. She observes that this tendency 
toward gender essentialism results in the silencing of the verv same voices ignored by mainstream 
legal jurisprudence - including the voices of women of color. See id. To claim the existence 
of 2 monolithic , universal "woman's voice" is in fact to claim that the voice of white, hetero-
sexual, socioeconomically privileged women can speak for all other women. See id. at 588; see 
also E. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL \VOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 4 
(I g88) ("[T]he real problem has been how feminist theory has confused the condition of one 
group of women with the condition of all."); Crenshaw, Denzarginalizing tlze Intersection of 
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and 
Racist Politics, I989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. IJ9 , I52-6o (arguing that feminist theory has been 
built only upon the experiences of white women). 
21 See A. LORDE, 4ge, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER 
OUTSIDER I 14, I 2 2 (I 984) ("Now we must recognize differences among women who are our 
equals, neither inferior nor superior, and devise ways to see each others' difference to enrich 
our visions and our joint struggles.''); Harris, supra note q , at 585-86; Kline, supra note r 7, 
at I so ("(I]t is imperati\·e that white feminist legal theorists problematize and complicate our 
analyses by taking in to account the real and contradictor\· differences of interest and power 
between women that are generated by, and generate, racism."); see also Cain, Feminist Juris-
fnudenc e: Grounding the Theori es, 4 BERKELEY Wo~rE;-.;'s L.J. I9L 20-t-05 (rggol ("Good 
feminist thought ought to reflec t the real differences in women's realities , in our lived experiences. 
These include differences of race, class, age , physical a bility and sexual preference." (citation 
omitted) ) 
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cutions to demonstrate the advantages of a discourse that combines 
elements of racial equality and privacy theories in advocating the 
reproductive rights of women of color. 
Although women accused of prenatal crimes can present their 
defenses only in court, judges are not the only government officials 
charged with a duty to uphold the Constitution. 22 Given the Supreme 
Court's current hostility to claims of substantive equality23 and repro-
ductive rights, 24 my arguments might be directed more fruitfully to 
legislatures than to the courts. 25 Robin West, among others, has 
22 The fourteenth amendment, for example, explicitly gives Congress the power to enforce 
the equal protection clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § s. 
23 See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762-63 (1989) (allowing white plaintiffs to 
challenge affirmative action consent decrees on grounds of reverse discrimination); Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-5 2, 659-60 ( I989) (limiting the basis for establishing 
a prima facie case of discrimination and shifting the burden of proving discrimination to 
employees in title VII "disparate impact" actions); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, sos-o6 (I989) (striking down set-aside program for minority contractors as reverse 
discrimination). But see Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, I IO S. Ct. 2 997, 3009 (I 990) 
(upholding FCC policy designed to achieve more diverse programming by encouraging minority 
ownership of broadcast licenses). 
24 See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, I IO S. Ct. 2926, 2969-70 (I990) (upholding state statute 
requiring notification of two parents before a minor may obtain an abortion unless she secures 
a court order); ·webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 305 2 (I 989) (permitting 
state restrictions on abortion, including a ban on the use of public facilities for performing some 
abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (r98o) (upholding version of Hyde /.mendment 
that withheld federal Medicaid funds used to reimburse costs of abortion not necessary to save 
the mother's life); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (I977) (permitting states to deny welfare 
payments for nontherapeutic abortions). 
25 Professor \Vest argues that "for both strategic and theoretical reasons, the proper audience 
for the development of a progressive interpretation of the Constitution is Congress rather than 
the courts." \Vest, Progressive and C onser-uative Constitutionalism, supra note 14, at 650 
(emphasis in original). Alan Freeman has expressed a similar sentiment in more blunt terms: 
"If the federal courts are to become, as they were in the past, little more than reactionary 
apologists for the existing order, we should treat them with the contempt they deserve. One 
can only hope that other political institutions will be reinvigorated." Freeman, Antidiscrimi-
nation Law: The View from 1989, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1407, I44I (I990). I do not advocate 
abandoning litigation as a st;·ategy for challenging government abuses. Rather, I am suggesting 
the exploration of other forums for taking collective action to implement visions of a just society. 
State courts and state constitutions may also provide a more progressive understanding of 
equal protection and privacy rights. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv 489 (I977); Developments in the Law- The Interpretation 
of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1442-43 (1982). State courts, for 
example, have interpreted the right of teenagers to obtain an abortion without parental consent 
more broadly under the state constitution's right of privacy than the Supreme Court has under 
the federal Constitution. Com pare American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 2 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 46, 55 (Cal Ct. App. I989) (affirming the issuance of a preliminary injunction of law that 
prohibited minors from obtaining abortions without parental consent or court order as violating 
state constitutional right of privacy) and In re T. VI., SS 1 So. 2d II86, I 194 (Fla. 1989) (holding 
that a Florida statute requiring minors to obtain parental consent or court order prior to 
obtaining abortion violated the right of pri\·acy guaranteed by Florida's constitution ) with 
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 1 ro S. Ct. 2926, 2969-70 (1990) (holding that a parental notif]cation 
requirement \Vith judicially granted exception does not viotatc the Constitution). 
- ·~ 
; 
' 
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persuasively recharacterized the progressive interpretation of the con-
stitutional guarantees of liberty and equality - such as the redistri-
butive directive embodied in the fourteenth amendment26 - as "po-
litical ideals to guide legislation, rather than as legal restraints on 
legislation. "2 7 
Legislatures may be more receptive than courts to the claim that 
punitive policies contribute to the subordinate status of Black women. 
They can serve as a forum for presenting both a vision of a community 
free from racist standards of motherhood and as a means of collec-
tively implementing that vision. This Article translates the dehuman-
ization that Black women experience so that lawmakers may under-
stand and reverse - or at least must confront - the injustice of the 
prosecutions. 28 
Part II of this Article presents background information about the 
recent prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers and explains why most 
of the defendants are poor and Black. Part III sets out the context 
in which the prosecutions must be understood: the historical deval-
uation of Black women as mothers. I discuss three aspects of this 
social phenomenon- the control of Black women's reproductive lives 
during slavery, the abusive sterilization of Black women and other 
women of color du~ing this century, and the disproportionate removal 
of Black children from their families. I also describe how a popular 
mythology denigrating Black motherhood has reinforced and legiti-
mated this devaluation. Part IV characterizes the prosecutions as 
punishing drug-addicted women for having babies . This approach 
exposes the impact that the government's punitive policy has on the 
devaluation of Black women as mothers. Part V argues that the 
prosecutions violate the equal protection clause because they are 
rooted in and perpetuate Black subordination . Part VI examines the 
legal scholarship opposing state intervention in the lives of pregnant 
women . I show that the typical arguments advanced against inter-
vention are inadequate to explain or challenge the criminal charges 
brought against drug-addicted mothers. 
Finally, Part VII argues that punishing women for having babies 
violates their constitutional right of privacy for two reasons: it violates 
the right of autonomy of women over their reproductive decisions, 
and it creates an invidious government standard for childbearing. I 
discuss two benefits of privacy doctrine for advocating the reproduc-
tive rights of women of color: its emphasis on the value of personhood, 
26 S ee West, Progressive and C onser·uative C ons titutionaii sm, sup ra note 14 , a t 7 I 5. 
li !d . at 717. 
28 Professor Ball a rgues th a t some min ority sc holars are engaged in transla ting, or ma king 
visible , t heir world so that t hey may influenc e a nd eventu a lly transfo rm the world of com·en-
tional academia. See Ball, Th e Legal A cademy and ivfinorit y Scholars, ro3 HARV. L. REv. 
rSs s, r857- 6o ( 1990). 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
and its protection against the abuse of government power. I argue, 
however, that the liberal interpretation of privacy is inadequate to 
eliminate the subordination of Black women. I therefore suggest that 
a progressive understanding of priv_acy must acknowledge govern-
ment's affirmative obligation to guarantee the rights of personhood 
and must recognize the connection between the right of privacy and 
racial equality. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE STATE'S PUNITIVE RESPONSE TO 
DRUG-ADDICTED MOTHERS 
A. The Crack Epidemic and the State's Response 
Crack cocaine appeared in America in the early I g8os, and its 
abuse has grown to epidemic proportions. 29 Crack is especially pop-
ular among inner-city women. 30 Indeed, evidence shows that, in 
several urban areas in the United States, more women than men now 
smoke crack. 31 Most crack-addicted women are of childbearing age, 
and many are pregnant. 32 This phenomenon has contributed to an 
explosion in the number of newborns affected by maternal drug use. 
Some experts estimate that as many as 3 7 5 ,ooo drug-exposed infants 
are born every year. 33 In many urban hospitals, the number of these 
newborns has quadrupled in the last five years. 34 A widely cited I g88 
study conducted by the National Association for Perinatal Addiction 
Research and Education (NAPARE) found that eleven percent of 
29 See Crack: A Disaster of Historic Dimension, Still Growing, N.Y. Times, May 28, I989, 
§ 4, at q, col. r (editorial). 
30 Approximately half of the nation's crack addicts are women. See Alters, Women and 
Crack: Equal Addiction, Unequal Care, Boston Globe, Nov. I, I989, at I, col. r. Some have 
theorized that women arc attracted to crack because it can be smoked rather than injected. See 
Teltsch, In Detroit, a Dn1g Recovery Center that 1-Velcomes the Pregnant Addict, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 20, 1990, at Aq, col. I. The highest concentrations of crack addicts are found in inner-
city neighborhoods. See Malcolm, Crack, Bane of Inner City, Is Now G,-ipping Suburbs, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. I, I 989, 9 I, at I , col. r. 
3! See Kolata, On Streets Ruled by Crack, Families Die, N.Y. Times, Aug. II, I989, at 
AI3, col. 3· 
32 Many crack-addicted women become pregnant as a result of trading sex for crack or 
turning to prostitution to support their habit. See Alters, supra note 30, at I, col. I; Kolata, 
supra note 6, at AI3, col. I. Crack seems t•J encourage sexual activity, in contrast to the 
passivity induced by heroin addiction. See Alters, supra note 30, at I, col. I 
33 See Besharov, Crack Babies: The Worst ThYCat Is l'v!om Herself, Wash. Post, Aug. 6, 
I989, at B I, col. I. Approximately Io ,ooo to Ioo,ooo of these newborns are exposed to cocaine 
or crack-cocaine. See Nolan, Protecting Fetuses from Prenatal Hazards: Whose C,-imes? What 
Punishment?, 9 CRIM. JusT. ETHICS 13, I4 (I990). 
34 The number of babies born to cocaine-addicted mothers in New York City, for example, 
has more than quadrupled since r985. See 11fore Births to Cocaine Users, N.Y. Times, Apr. 
7, 1990, at B3o, col. 2. 
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newborns in thirty-six hospitals surveyed were affected by their moth-
ers' illegal-drug use durin g pregnancy. 35 In several hospitals , the 
proportion of drug-exposed infants was as high as fifteen and twenty-
five percent. 36 
Babies born to drug-addicted mothers may suffer a variety of 
medical, developmental, and behavioral problems, depending on the 
nature of their mother's substance abuse. Immediate effects of cocaine 
exposure can include premature birth , 3 7 low birth weight, 38 and with-
drawal symptoms. 39 Cocaine-exposed children have also exhibited 
neurobehavioral problems such as mood dysfunction, organizational 
deficits , poor attention, and impaired human interaction , although it 
has not been determined whether these conditions are 
permanent. 40 Congenital disorders and deformities have also been 
associated with cocaine use during pregnancy. 41 According to NA-
PARE, babies exposed to cocaine have a tenfold greater risk of suf-
ferin g sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). 42 
Data on the extent and potential severity of the adverse effects of 
maternal cocaine use are controversial. 43 The interpretation of studies 
of cocaine-exposed infants is often clouded by the presence of other 
35 See Davidson, Drug Bab ies Push Issu e of Fetal Rights, L.A . Times, Apr. 25, 1989, pt. 
1, at 3, col. 3· 
.>6 See id. 
37 See Chasnoff, Griffith, MacGrego r, Dirkes & Burns, Temporal Patterns of Co caine Use 
in Pregnancy: Peri natal Outcome, 261 ]. A.M.A. 1741, I742 (1989); MacGregor, Keith , C has-
noff , Rosne r, C hisum , Shaw & M in ogue, Cocaine Use During Pregnancy: Adverse Perinatal 
Outcome, 157 AM. ]. OBSTETRICS & GYN. 686, 687 (r987); Neerhof, MacGregor, R etz ky & 
Sulliva n, Cowine Abuse During PYegnancy: Peripartum Pre-ualence and Perinatal Outcome, r6r 
AM. ]. OBSTETRICS & GYN. 63.3, 635 (1989) . 
.lS S ee Petitti & Coleman, Cocaine and the Risk of Low B irth Weight , So AM . J. PuB. 
HEALTH 25 , 25 (1990); K err , Crack Addictio n: The Tragic Toll on Women and The ir Childre n, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1987 , at B2, col. r. 
39 See C hasnoff, Newbom I nfants <..:}ith Drug Withdrawal Symptoms, 9 PEDIATRICS REv. 
273 (1988). 
40 See Chasnoff. Cocaine, Pregnancy and th e Neonat e, rs \VOMEN & H EALTH 23, 32-.B 
(1989); Chasnoff, Burns , Schnall & Burns , Co caine Use in Pregnancy, 313 NEw ENG. ]. MED. 
666 , 669 (1985); Howard , Cocaine and Its Effects on the Newborn, 31 DEV. MEo. & CH ILD 
NEUROLOGY 255, 256 (1989). 
41 See Chasnoff, Griffi th, MacGregor, Dirkes & Burns, supra note 37, at 1743-44; Rev kin, 
Crack in the Cradle, DISCOVER, Sept. 1989 , at 62, 63 ; Defects R epoYted in Babies of Cocaine 
Usen, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1989, § r , at If , co l. r. But see Chasnoff, Peri natal Effects of 
Cocaine , CoNT EMP. OBIGYN, May 1987, at 163, 176 ("Cocaine can not be linked to an in creased 
incidence of congenital malformation s.") . 
42 See Marcotte , supra note r o, at 14 ; see also Chasnoff, Burns & Burns, Cocaine Use in 
Pregnancy: Perinatal1Vforbi dity and lvfortality , 9 NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 29 1, 292 
(1987) (find ing 15 % incidence of SIDS in cocaine-exposed infants). 
43 S ee Koren , Graham , Shear & E in a rson , Bias Against the Null H ypothesis: Th e Repro-
ductive Hazards of Cocaine , LANCET, Dec. r 6, 1989 , at 1440, 1440; Blakeslee , Chi ld-R earing 
Is Stonny when Dmgs Cloud Birth, N.Y. Ti m es , l'>'lay rg, 1990, § r , at r, col. 3 · 
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fetal risk factors, such as the mother's use of additional drugs, ciga-
rettes, and alcohol and her socioeconomic status. 44 For example, the 
health prospects of an infant are significantly threatened because preg-
nant addicts often receive little or no prenatal care and may be 
malnourished. 45 Moreover, because the medical community has given 
more attention to studies showing adverse effects of cocaine exposure 
than to those that deny these effects, the public has a distorted per-
ception of the risks of maternal cocaine use. 46 Researchers have not 
yet authoritatively determined the percentage of infants exposed to 
cocaine who actually experience adverse consequences. 47 
The response of state prosecutors, legislators, and judges to the 
problem of drug-exposed babies has been punitive. They have pun-
ished women who use drugs during pregnancy by depriving these 
mothers of custody of their children, by jailing them during their 
pregnancy, and by prosecuting them after their babies are born. 
The most common penalty for a mother's prenatal drug use is the 
permanent or temporary removal of her baby. 48 Hospitals in a num-
ber of states now screen newborns for evidence of drugs in their urine 
and report positive results to child welfare authorities. 49 Some child 
protection agencies institute neglect proceedings to obtain custody of 
babies with positive toxicciogies based solely on these tests. 50 lVIore 
44 See Koren, Graham, Shear & Einarson, supra note 43, at I44I. 
45 See Poland, Ager & Olson, Barrien to Receiving Adequate Prenatal Ca-re, 157 AM. ]. 
OBSTETRICS & GYN. 297, 300 (r987); Ryan, Ehrlich & Finnegan, Cocaine Abuse in Pregnancy: 
Effects on the Fetus and Newborn, 9 NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 295, 298 (1987). A 
Northwestern University study of pregnant cocaine addicts found that comprehensive prenatal 
care may improve the outcome of pregnancies complicated by coca.ine abuse. See MacGregor, 
Keith, Bachicha & Chasnoff, Cocaine Abuse During Pregnancy: Correlation Between Prenatal 
Care and Perinatal Outcome, 74 OBSTETRICS & GYN. 882, 885 (1989). 
46 See Koren, Graham, Shear & Einarson, supra note 43, at I440-41. 
4 7 See Nolan, supra note 33, at I4. 
48 See Sherman, Keeping Babies Free of Drugs, NAT'L L.]., Oct. 16, 1989 , at r, col. 4; 
Gorman, Involuntary Drug Testing of New 1Vf.others Gives Birth to Legal Debate, L.A. Times, 
Apr. 14, 1988, pt. 2, at I, col. I. 
49 Several states have enacted statutes that require the reporting of positive newborn toxi-
cologies to state authorities. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. II9, § SIA (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 6z6.556(2)(c) (West Supp. I99I); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West Supp. 1991); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-504 (1989). Many hospitals also interpret state child abuse reporting 
laws to require them to report positive results. For a discussion of the constitutional and ethical 
issues raised by the drug screening of postpartum women and newborns, see Moss, Legal Issues: 
Drug Testing of Postpartum Women and Newborns as the Basis for Civil and Criminal Proceed-
ings, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1406, 1409-13 (1990); Moss, supra note 2, at 292-96. 
so See Moss, supra note 2, at 28g-go; Sherman, supra note 48, at 28, col. 4; Besharov, supra 
note 33, at B4 , col. 2. 
Several states have facilitated this process by expanding the statutory definition of neglected 
children to include infants who test positive for controlled substances at birth. See FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 415.503(9)(A)(2) (West Supp. 1991 ); Ill. Juvenile Ct. Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 
802-3, ~ 2-3(1)(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IND. CoDE ANN. § 31-6-4-3. 1(r)(b) (West Supp. 
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and more government authorities are also removing drug-exposed 
newborns from their mothers immediately after birth pending an in-
vestigation of parental fitness. 51 In these investigations, positive neo-
natal toxicologies often raise a strong presumption of parental unfit-
ness,52 which circumvents the inquiry into the mother's ability to care 
for her child that 1s customarily necessary to deprive a parent of 
custody. 53 
A second form of punishment is the "protective" incarceration of 
pregnant drug addicts charged with unrelated crimes. In rg88, a 
Washington, D.C. judge sentenced a thirty-year-old woman named 
Brenda Vaughn, who pleaded guilty to forging $700 worth of checks, 
to jail for the duration of her pregnancy. 54 The judge stated at 
sentencing that he wanted to ensure that the baby would be born in 
jail to protect it from its mother's drug abuse. 55 Although the Vaughn 
case has received the most attention, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
defendants' drug use during pregnancy often affects judges' sentencing 
decisions. 56 
Finally, women have been prosecuted after the birth of their chil-
dren for having exposed the fetuses to drugs or alcohol. 57 Creative 
I990); MASS . GEN. L. ch. II9, § 5IA (Supp. I990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.330(!)(b) 
(Michie 199 1); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § uor(4)(c) (West Supp. 1991). 
5 I See Note , The Problem of the Drug-E xposed Newborn: A Return to Principled In terven-
t io n , 42 STAN. L. REv. 745 , 749, 752 & n 25 (1990). 
52 See, e .g. , In re Stefanel T yesha C., 157 A.D.2d 322 , 325 -2 6 , 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 , 282-83 
(N .Y App. Di v . 1990) , appeal d is missed , 76 N.Y.2 d roo6 (1990) (holding that a llegations of a 
positi ve infa nt toxicology, along with the mother 's admitted drug use during pregnancy and 
fa ilure to enroll in a drug rehabilitation program, constituted a cause of action for neglec t); In 
re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. III, II6 , 293 N. W .2 d 736, 739 (1980) (holding that a drug-exposed 
newborn "may properly be considered a neglec ted child within the jurisdiction of the probate 
court"). For a critical analysis of the presumption of parental unfitness , see Note, supra note 
S I , a t 755-58. 
5.1 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982) (holding that proof of neglect by clear 
and convin cing evidence is co nstitutiona lly required before state may terminate parental rights). 
For a ge ne ra l description and cr itique of state neglect statutes, see \Vald , State In terventio;1. on 
B ehalf of "Neglec ted" Chi ldren: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Hom es, lv! oni-
loring th e Status of Children in Foste r Care, and Termination of Parental R ights, 28 STAN . L 
REV. 623 , 628-35, 643-48, 665 - 72 (19 76). 
54 See U nited States v. Vaughn , C ri m. No. F 2 r 7 2-88 B (D. C. Super. Ct. Aug. 2 3, 1988); 
M oss, Pregnant! Go Dire ctly to Jail , A .B. A .. J., Nov. I , 1988, at 20; Cohen, When a Fetus 
Has More Rights than llze M oth er, Wash. Post, July 28, 1988, at A2r, col. I; see also Cox v 
Court, 42 Ohio App. 3d J7I, 17 3 , 53 7 N.E.2 d 721, 723 (I988) (reversin g juvenile court order 
placing a pregnant woman in a "sec ure drug fac ility" to protec t the fetus from the woman's 
cocain e u se) . 
55 A t Vau ghn's sentencing, Jud ge Pe ter Wolf stated: "I'm going to keep her locked up un t il 
the ba by is born because sh e's tested posit ive for cocaine w he n she ca me befo re m e . She's 
appa rently a n a ddicti ve personal ity. a nd I'll be darned if l';n goi ng to have a baby born th at 
w ay." Moss, supra note 54, at 20. 
56 See D avidson , supm note 35, a t 19, co!. 1. 
s; See supra notes 2 & 5· 
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statutory interpretations that once seemed little more than the outlan-
dish concoctions of conservative scholars58 are now used to punish 
women. Mothers of children affected by prenatal substance abuse 
have been charged with crimes such as distributing drugs to a minor, 
child abuse and neglect, manslaughter, and assault with a deadly 
weapon. 
This Article considers the constitutional implications of criminal 
prosecution of drug-addicted mothers because, as Part IV explains, 
this penalty most directly pumshes poor Black women for having 
babies. When the government prosecutes, its intervention is not de-
signed to protect babies from the irresponsible actions of their mothers 
(as is arguably the case when the state takes custody of a pregnant 
addict or her child). Rather, the government criminalizes the mother 
as a consequence of her decision to bear a child. 
B. The Disproportionate Impact on Poor Black Women 
Poor Black women bear the brunt of prosecutors' punitive ap-
proach. 59 These women are the primary targets of prosecutors, not 
because they are more likely to be guilty of fetal abuse, but because 
they are Black and poor. Poor women, who are disproportionately 
Black, 60 are in closer contact with government agencies, and their 
drug use is therefore more likely to be detected. Black women are 
also more likely to be reported to government authorities, in part 
because of the racist attitudes of health care professionals. 61 Fidally, 
their failure to meet society's image of the ideal mother makes their 
prosecution more acceptable. 
To charge drug-addicted mothers with crimes, the state must be 
able to identify those who use drugs during pregnancy. Because poor 
women are generally under greater government supervision- through 
their associations with public hospitals, welfare agencies, and proba-
tion officers - their drug use is more likely to be detected and 
reported. 62 Hospital screening practices result in disproportionate re-
53 See, e.g., Parness, The Duty to Prn•ent Handicaps: Laws Pmmoting the Prevention of 
Handicaps to Newborns, 5 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 431, 442~52 (1983); Parness & Pritchard, 
supra note r 3, at 2 70 (advocating that states "promote the unborn's potentiality for life by 
outlawing fetus endangerment, abandonment, neglect and nonsupport") (citations omitted). 
59 See supra note 6. 
60 Black women are five times more likely to live in poverty, five times more likely to be on 
welfare , and three times more likely to be unemployed than are white women. See UNITED 
STATES CoM~!'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF BLACK WOME:--1 I (1990). 
6 1 See infra notes 70~78 and accompanying text. 
62 See McNulty, supra note 8, at 319; see also Faller & Ziefert, Causes of Child Abuse and 
Negle ct, in SOCIAL WORK WITH ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 32, 46~47 (K. Faller ed. 
I 98 I) (providing a similar explanation of why poor parents are more likely to be reported for 
child neglect). 
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porting of poor Black women. 63 The government's main source of 
information about prenatal drug use is hospitals' reporting of positive 
infant toxicologies to child welfare authorities. Hospitals serving poor 
minority communities implement this testing almost exclusively. 64 Pri-
vate physicians who serve more affluent women perform less of this 
screening both because they have a financial stake both in retaining 
their patients' business and securing referrals from them and because 
they are socially more like their patients. 65 
Hospitals administer drug tests in a manner that further discrim-
inates against poor Black women . One common criterion triggering 
an infant toxicology screen is the mother's failure to obtain prenatal 
care, 66 a factor that correlates strongly with race and income. 6 7 Worse 
still, many hospitals have no formal screening procedures, relying 
solely on the suspicions of health care professionals. 68 This discretion 
allows doctors and hospital staff to perform tests based on their ste-
reotyped assumptions about drug addicts. 69 
Health care professionals are much more likely to report Black 
women's drug use to government authorities than they are similar 
drug use by their wealthy white patients. 70 A study recently reported 
in The New England J ou·rnal of Me dicine demonstrated this racial 
bias in the reporting of maternal drug use . 71 Researchers studied the 
results of toxicologic tests of pregnant women who received prenatal 
care in public health clinics and in private obstetrical offices in Pinellas 
County, Florida. 72 Little difference existed in the prevalence of sub-
stance abuse by pregnant women along either racial or economic 
63 See Note, supra note SI , at 753, 782 n. IS?; Kalata, supra note 3 I , at AI,3, col. ,3. 
64 See Note, supra note 5 I, at 753· 
65 See Chas noff, Landress & Barre tt, Tlze Pre-l'alence of llli cit-Dmg or ,Ilcolzol Use Dzning 
Pregnancy and Discrepancies in 1'vfandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW 
E NG. J. MED. 1202 , 1205 (tabl e 3) (1990); Angel, Addicted Babies : Legal System's R esponse 
UncleaY, L.A. Daily ]. , Feb. 29 , 1988, at r, col. 6. 
66 See Note, supm note 5 r, at 75.3, 798-99. 
6 7 See Moss, su pm note 49 , at qr2; infm notes 14.3- 146 and acco mpanying text. 
68 See N ote, supra note 51, at 75.3· 
69 See Chasnoff, Landress & Barrett, supya note 65, at I 206 ; Note, sup ra note 5 I, a t 7 54 & 
n. ,36; see also Faller & Zicfert, supm note 62, at 47 (noting that professionals a re more likely 
to report child abuse by poor parents because of their disbelief in abuse by their ow n socioeco-
nomic class). 
70 See Note, supra note 51 , at 754 & n. 36; C hasnoff , Landress & Barrett , supra note 65 , at 
!2 05. 
7 1 See C hasnoff , La nd ress , & Barrett , supra note 65, a t 1205 (tab le 3). 
72 See id. at 1203. The researchers tested urine samples from 715 pregnant wo men who 
enroll ed for prenatal care in the co unty durin g a one-month period. Three hundred eighty 
women a t fi ve public health clinics and 335 wome n a t 1 2 pr ivate obstetrical offices we re scree ned 
for alcohol, opia tes, cocaine a nd its metabolites, an d cann abin oids between Jan uary r and June 
30 , 1989 . 
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lines, 73 nor was there any significant difference between public clinics 
and private offices. 74 Despite similar rates of substance abuse, how-
ever, Black women were ten times more likely than whites to be 
reported to public health authorities 75 for substance abuse during 
pregnancy. 76 Although several possible explanations can account for 
this disparate reporting, 7i both public health facilities and private 
doctors are more inclined to turn in pregnant Black women who use 
drugs than pregnant white women who use drugs. 78 
It is also significant that, out of the universe of maternal conduct 
that can injure a fetus, 79 prosecutors have focused on crack use. The 
selection of crack addiction for punishment can be justified neither by 
the number of addicts nor the extent of the harm to the fetus. Ex-
cessive alcohol consumption during pregnancy, for example, can cause 
severe fetal injury, so and marijuana use may also adversely affect the 
73 See id. at 1204. The ra te of positive res ults on toxicologic testing for white women 
(15-4%) was sli ghtly higher th a n that for Black women (q. I%) . See id. at 1204 (table 2). 
74 "The freq uency of a positive result was I6.3% for women seen a t the public clinics and 
13.1 % for women seen at the private offices." !d. at 1203 (table r). 
75 In March 1987, the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilita tive Services ado pted a 
policy requ iring hosp ita ls to report to local health departments evidence of drug and alc ohol use 
during pregnancy. Se e id. at 1202- 03. 
76 See id. at I 204. 
77 The authors of the Pinellas County study suggest several reasons for th e disc rep a ncy in 
reporting. Physicia ns may have been prompted to test Black women and their infants more 
frequently because the infan ts displayed more seve re symptoms or because Black women intox-
icated from smoking crack are more readily identified than white women intoxicated from 
smoking marijuana . Se e id . at r 205. Additionally, the disproportionate report in g of Blac k 
wo men may result from socioeco nomic factors and the mistaken preconception th a t substance 
abuse during pregnan cy is predominantly an inner-city, minority group problem. See id. at 
1206. The second explanation does not negate the racist na ture of the rate of reporting a nd 
subseq uen t prosec uti on of women who use drugs during pregnancy, however. Even if physicians 
do not consciously de cide to report Black women rather than white women, their testing and 
reporting practices unjustifiably disc riminate against Black women and thus d emonstrate their 
unconscious racism. See Lawrence , Th e I d, the E go, and Equal PYotection: Reckoning wi th 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 316, 328-44 (r987). 
78 The striking degree of differe nce between the reporting rate of drug use by Black women 
and that of white wome n a nd the s imilarity in their rates of substance abuse stron gly suggests 
that racial prejudice and stereotyping must be a factor. 
79 Numero us maternal ac ti vities are poten tially harmful to th e developing fetus, including 
dr inking a lcohoL taking prescription and nonprescription dru gs, smoking cigarettes, fa iling to 
eat properly, and residing at high altitudes for prolonged periods. S ee, e.g., INSTITUTE OF 
MED., PR EVENT ING LOW BIRTHWEIGHT 65 - 72 ( t985); Berkowitz, Holford & Berkowitz, Effec ts 
of Cigarette S moking, Alco hol, Coffee and Tea Consumption on Pretenn DeliveYy. i EARLY 
Hl.'M. DEv. 23 9 (198 2) ; Note, PaYental Liability for Prenatal lnjzlYy, I4 COLUlvl. J.L. & Soc. 
PROBS. 4 7, 7 3-7 5 (1978) . Cond uct by people other than the pregnant woman can a lso thre a ten 
the health of the fetu s. A pregnant woman 's exposure to secondary cigarette sm oke, sexually 
transmitted and other infec tious diseases, en vironmental ha.zards such as radiation an d lead , 
a nd physical a buse can harm the fe tus. See CH ILDREN's DEFENS E FuND , THE HEALTH OF 
A'>IE RICA'S CHILDREN 35-3 7 ( 1989) ; N ote, supYa note 8, at 6o6-o;. 
so I nfants born to mothers who drink heav ily during pregnancy may suffer from feta l a lc ohol 
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unborn. 81 The incidence of both these types of substance abuse is 
high as well. 82 In addition, prosecutors do not always base their claims 
on actual harm to the child, but on the mere delivery of crack by the 
mother. 83 Although different forms of substance abuse prevail among 
pregnant women of various socioeconomic levels and racial and ethnic 
backgrounds, 84 inner-city Black communities have the highest con-
centrations of crack addicts. 85 Therefore, selecting crack abuse as the 
primary fetal harm to be punished has a discriminatory impact that 
cannot be medically justified. 
Focusing on Black crack addicts rather than on other perpetrators 
of fetal harms serves two broader social purposes. 86 First, prosecution 
of these pregnant women serves to degrade women whom society 
syndrome, characterized by physical malformations, small head and body size, poor mental 
capabilities, and abnormal behavior patterns, including mental retardation. See Clarren & 
Smith, The Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. I063 (I9i8); Ouellette, Rosett, 
Rosman & Weiner, Adverse Effects on Offspring of M atemal Alcohol Abuse During Pregnancy, 
297 NEW ENG. J. MED. 528 (I9i7l- Some experts believe that prenatal alcohol exposure is the 
most common known cause of mental retardation in this country. See Rosenthal, When a 
Pregnant Woman Drinks, N.Y. Times , Feb. 4 , I990, § 6 (Magazine), at 30. 
sr Marijuana use during pregnancy has been associated with impaired fetal development and 
reduced gestational length. See, e.g., Fried, Watkinson & Willan, Marijuana Use During 
Pregnancy and Decreased Length of Gestation, ISO AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYN. 23 (I984); 
Zuckerman, Frank, Hingson, Amaro, Levenson, Kayne, Parker, Vinci, Aboagye, Fried, Cabral, 
Timperi & Bauchner, Effects of Matemal Mm·ijuana and Cocaine Use on Fetal Growth , 320 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 762 (I989) [hereinafter Effects of Maternal i'vfarijuana]. 
82 Approximately 6ooo to 8ooo newborns each year suffer from fetal alcohol syndrome. See 
Nolan, supra note 33, at IS. An additional 35,ooo infants experience less severe effects of 
maternal drinking. See Doctors Criticized on Fetal Problem, N.Y. Times, Dec. I I, I 990, at 
Bro, col. 6. A study of 2200 women who gave birth at the University of vVashington Hospital 
in Seattle from March I989 to March 1990 and who used drugs during or immediately before 
pregnancy revealed that 20% smoked marijuana, I6% used cocaine, and 9% used either heroin, 
methadone, or amphetamines. See Blakeslee, Parents Fight for a Future for Infants Born to 
Dmgs , N.Y. Times, May I9, I99D, at Ar, col. 3; see also Effects of Aiaternal AlaYijuana, supra 
note 81, at 762 (noting that in I 985 , 3 I% of American women in their late teens and early 
twenties reported using marijuana within the past year). 
83 See State Case Summary, supra note 2; infra note 260. 
8" See Chasnoff, Landress & Barrett, supra note 65, at I2o4; Malcolm, supra note 30, at r, 
col. I. A I 989 study of 22 78 highly educated women found that 30% consumed more than one 
drink per week while pregnant. See Rosenthal, supra note So, at 49· Furthermore, despite the 
media's depiction of crack addiction as an exclusively inner-city problem, crack use among 
middle-class and affluent people is on the rise. See Elmer-DeWitt, A Plague Without Bound-
aries: Cmck, Once a ProbLem of the Poor, Iwuades the 111iddle Class, TIME, Nov. 6, I989. at 
97; Malcolm, supm note 30, at 1, col. 1. 
S.i See Malcolm. supm note 30, at I, col. I. The Pinellas County study, for example, found 
that Black women tested positive more frequently· for cocaine use during pregnancy ( 7. 5% versus 
r.8% for white women), whereas white women tested positive more frequently for the use of 
marijuana (14-4':/c versus 6.o% for Black women). See Chasnoff, Landress &: Barrett, supra 
note 65, at. I2D4 (table 2). 
86 See Roberts. The Bias in Drug A1-rests of Pregnant Women, N.Y. Times, Aug. I r, I990, 
at 2 s, col. 2. 
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views as undeserving to be mothers and to discourage them from 
having children. If prosecutors had instead chosen to prosecute afflu-
ent women addicted to alcohol or prescription medication, the policy 
of criminalizing prenatal conduct very likely would have suffered a 
hasty demise. Society is much more willing to condone the punish-
ment of poor women of color who fail to meet the middle-class ideal 
of motherhood. 
In addition to legitimizing fetal rights enforcement, the prosecution 
of crack-addicted mothers diverts public attention from social ills such 
as poverty, racism, and a misguided national health policy and implies 
instead that shamefully high Black infant death rates87 are caused by 
the bad acts of individual mothers. Poor Black mothers thus become 
the scapegoats for the causes of the Black community's ill health. 
Punishing them assuages any guilt the nation might feel at the plight 
of an underclass with infant mortality at rates higher than those in 
some less developed countries. 88 Making criminals of Black mothers 
apparently helps to relieve the nation of the burden of creating a 
health care system that ensures healthy babies for all its citizens. 89 
For a variety of reasons, then, an informed appraisal of the com-
peting interests involved in the prosecutions must take account of the 
race of the women affected. Part III examines a significant aspect of 
Black women's experience that underlies the punishment of crack-
addicted mothers. 
III. THE DEVALUATION OF BLACK MOTHERHOOD 
The systematic, institutionalized denial of reproductive freedom 
has uniquely marked Black women's history in America. An impor-
tant part of this denial has been the devaluation of Black women as 
mothers. A popular mythology that degrades Black women and por-
trays them as less deserving of motherhood reinforces this subordi-
~~ In I 987, the mortality rate for Black infants was 17.9 deaths per 1000, compared to a 
rate of 8.6 deaths per 1000 for white infants. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF 
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U:--i!TED STATES 77 (table I ro) ( 1990). 
ss In Ig86, the Black infant mortality rate (I8 death:; per 1000 live births) was higher than 
the infant mortality rate in Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Singapore. See CHILDREN'S 
DEFENSE Fu:--~D, supra note 79, at q (table I.8) (1989). A Black infant born in the inner city 
has an c\"Cn greater chance of dying before reaching his first birthciay. See id. at 23 (table 
I .10) 
89 Descriptions of the degeneracy and disintegration of the Black family have played a similar 
role in explaining poverty, crime, and unemployment in the Black community. The self-
destructiveness of Blacks is often blamed for their predicament rather than racism. See Gres-
ham, The Politics of Family in America, NATION, July 2-tiJI, rg8g, at I r6, I r 7-rg (discussing 
how the Moynihan Report on the Black family and the CBS Special Report, Tlze Vanishing 
Black Family- Crisis in Blark America, made the Black familv the scapegoat for the condition 
of Black America!. 
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nation. This mythology is one aspect of a complex set of images that 
deny Black humanity in order to rationalize the oppression of 
Blacks. 90 
In this Part, I will discuss three manifestations of the devaluation 
of Black motherhood: the original exploitation of Black women during 
slavery, the more contemporary, disproportionate removal of Black 
children from their mothers' custody, and ste rilization abuse. 
Throughout this Part , I will also show how several popular images 
denigrating Black mothers - the licentious Jezebel, the careless, in-
competent mother, the domineering matriarch , and the lazy welfare 
mother - have reinforced and legitimated their devaluation. 
A. Th e Slavery Experience 
The essence of Black women's experience during slavery was the 
brutal denial of autonomy over reproduction. Female slaves were 
commercially valuable to their masters not only for their labor, but 
also for their capacity to produce more slaves. 9 1 Henry Louis Gates, 
Jr., writing about the autobiography of a slave named Harriet A. 
Jacobs, observes that it "charts in vivid detail precisely how the shape 
of her life and the choices she makes are defined by her reduction to 
a sexual object, an object to be raped, bred or abused. "92 Black 
women's childbearing during slavery was thus largely a product of 
oppression rather than an expression of self-definition and personhood. 
90 See, e.g., id. a t I 20 (d escribi ng the dom in an t soc iety's resistance to the concept o f Blac k 
people as "vulnerable human beings") . F or a disc ussion of th e hegemo nic functio n of racist 
ideology , see Crenshaw, supra note 14, at IJ70- 8r ( I988). See genemlly G. FREDRICKSON, THE 
BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 2 56-8 2 ( I 97 I) (discussin g the propagation of theories of 
Blac k infer io rity and degeneracy a t the turn of the century); J. WILLIAMSO N, THE CRuCIBLE 
OF RACE: BLACK-\VHITE RELATIO NS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION I I 1-5 I 
(1984) (d iscussin g the prevalence of theories near the turn of the century that B lacks, freed from 
slavery, were returning to their "natural state of bestiality"). 
91 See A. DAVIS, WOMEN , RACE, AND CLASS 7 ( I 98I); J. }ONES , LABOR OF LOVE , L ABOR 
OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK AND THE fAMILY FROl\1 S LAVERY TO THE PRESENT 12 
( I985). Legislation g iv ing t he ch ild ren of B lac k women a nd white men the s tatus of slaHs left 
fema le s laves v ulnerable to sexua l v iol ation as a m eans of financ ia l gain . See P. GIDDING S, 
WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: TH E I MPACT OF BLACK WOME N Qt.; RACE Al'>D SEX IN ArvtERICA 
37 (1984). For a discussion of such laws in Virginia and Georgia, see A. HIGG INBOTHAM, I N 
TH E MATTER OF COLOR 42-45, 252 (1978). 
White masters controlled th eir s laves' rep roductive capacity by rewarding pregnancy with 
relief from wo rk in the field and add ition s of clothing and food, puni shin g slave women who 
d id not give birth , manipulatin g sla\·c marital choices, forcing them to breed, and raping them. 
See J. }ONES , supra, at 34- .)S; WE ARE YOUR SISTERS : BLACK WOM EN IN THE N INETEENTH 
CENTURY 24-26 (D. S te rling eel. I984l; C li nto n , Caught in the Web of the Big House: Women 
and Slavery, in THE WEB OF SOUTHERN SoCI.-'I.L REL\TI O!'>S 19, 23-28 (\V. Raser, R. Saunders 
& J. Wakelyn eels . I 985 l 
n Gates, To be Raped, Bred m· . ..J.buscd, N.Y. TBtES Boor..: REv. , No\·. 22 , r987, at 12 
(reviewi ng H. }.-'\COBS, I:--; cmENTS IN THE LIFE OF.-\ SLAVE GIRL (j Yellin ed. 1987)) . 
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The method of whipping pregnant slaves that was used throughout 
the South vividly illustrates the slaveowners' dual interest in Black 
women as both workers and childbearers. Slaveowners forced women 
to lie face down in a depression in the ground while they were 
w hipped. 93 This procedure allowed the masters to protect the fetus 
while abusing the mother. It serves as a powerful metaphor for the 
evils of a fetal protection policy that denies the humanity of the 
mother. It is also a forceful symbol of the convergent oppressions 
inflicted on slave women: they were subjugated at once both as Blacks 
and as females. 
From slavery on, Black women have fallen outside the scope of 
the American ideal of womanhood. 94 Slave owners forced slave 
women to perform strenuous labor that contradicted the Victorian 
female roles prevalent in the dominant white society. Angela Davis 
has observed: "judged by the evolving nineteenth-century ideology of 
femininity, which emphasized women's roles as nurturing mothers and 
gentle companions and housekeepers for their husbands, Black women 
were practically anomalies. "95 Black women's historical deviation 
from traditional female roles has engendered a mythology that denies 
their womanhood. 
One of the most prevalent images of slave women was the char-
acter of Jezebel, a woman governed by her sexual desires. 96 As early 
as I7 36, the South Carolina Gazette described "African Ladies" as 
women "of 'strong robust constitution' who were 'not easily jaded out' 
but able to serve their lovers 'by Night as well as Day. "'97 This 
ideological construct of the licentious J ezebel legitimated white men's 
sexual abuse of Black women. 98 The stereotype of Black women as 
sexually promiscuous helped to perpetuate their devaluation as moth-
ers. 
The myth of the "bad" Black woman was deliberately and system-
atically perpetuated after slavery ended. 99 For example, historian 
93 See J. }ONES, supra note 91, at w; Johnson, supra note r, at 513. 
94 See A. DAVIS, supra note 91, at s; D. \VHITE, AR'N'T I A \VOMAN? FEMALE SLAVES IN 
THE PLANTATION SOUTH r6, 27-29 (1985). For a description of gender conventions in the 
plantation South, see E. FOX- GENOVESE, \VITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD 192-241 
(1988). 
Kimberle Crenshaw describes how racist ideology reflects an "oppositional dynamic, premised 
upon maintaining Blacks as an excluded and subordinated 'other."' Crenshaw, supra note q, 
at 1381. Under this pattern of oppositional categories, whites are associated with positive 
characteristics (industrious, intelligent, responsible); Blacks are associated with the opposite, 
aberrational qualities (lazy, ignorant, shiftless). See id. at I .3 70-71 & n. I 5 I. 
95 A. DAVIS, supra note 9I , at;. 
96 See D. \VHITE, supra note 94, at 28-29 
97 !d. at 30. 
o;; See E. Fox-GENOVESE , sufna note 94, at 292; D. \VHITE, supra note 94, at 6r. 
99 See BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AIIIERICA 163-71 (G. Lerner ed. 1973); P. GIDDINGS, 
su,tTri note gr. at 85-89; B. HooKs. mpra note I/, at ss-6o. 
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Philip A. Bruce's book, The Plantation Negro as a Freeman, published 
in r88g, strengthened popular views of both Black male and Black 
female degeneracy. 100 Bruce traced the alleged propensity of the Black 
man to rape white women to the "wantonness of the women of his 
own race" and "the sexual laxness of plantation women as a class . "10 1 
This image of the sexually loose, impure Black woman that originated 
in slavery persists in modern American culture. 10 2 
Black women during slavery were also systematically denied the 
rights of motherhood. Slave mothers had no legal claim to their 
children. 103 Slave masters owned not only Black women, but also 
their children. They alienated slave women from their children by 
selling them to other slaveowners and by controlling childrearing. 104 
In r85 r , Sojourner Truth reminded the audience at a women's rights 
convention that society denied Black women even the limited dignity 
of Victorian womanhood accorded white women of the time, including 
the right of mothering: 
Dat man ober dar say dat women needs to be helped into carriages, 
and lifted ober ditches, and to have de best place every whar. Nobody 
eber help me into carriages, or ober mud puddles, or gives me any 
best place . .. and ar'n't I a woman? Look at me! Look at my arm' 
... I have plowed, and planted , and gathered into barns, and no 
man could head me - and ar'n't I a woman? I could work as much 
and eat as much as a man (when I could get it), and bear de lash as 
well - and ar'n't I a woman? I have borne thirteen chilern and seen 
em mos' all sold off into slavery, and when I cried out with a mother's 
grief, none but Jesus heard - and ar'n't I a woman ?lOS 
Black women struggled in many ways to resist the efforts of slave 
masters to control their reproductive lives. They used contraceptives 
and abortives, escaped from plantations, feigned illness, endured se-
vere punishment, and fought back rather than submit to slave masters' 
sexual domination. 106 Free Black women with the means to do so 
IOO See Gresham , supra note 89 , at r 1 7. 
IOI P. BRUCE, THE PLANTATION NEGRO AS A fREEMAN 84-85 (r88g). 
10 2 See B. HOOKS, supra note 17, at 65 - 68; Omolade , Black Women, Black lvlen and Tawana 
Brawley: The Shared Condition, 12 H ARV. Wm.rEN's L.J. 12, r6 (1989). 
103 See Allen, Sun·ogacy, Slavery, and the Owners/z ip of Life, 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 
139, 140 n .9 (1990). Professor Allen tells the story of Polly, a woman wrongfully held in slavery, 
who successfully sued a white man in 1842 for th e return of her daughter Lucy. Poll y used 
slave law to prove unlawful possession. She argued that, because she was not in fact a slave 
at the tim e of Lucy's birth, she was the rightful owner of her daughter. See id. a t 142-44. 
I04 Se e id. a t 140 n.9; Burnham , Children of the Slave Community in the United States, 19 
fREEDOMWAYS 75, 75-77 (1979). 
105 0. GILBERT, NARRATIVE OF SOJOURNER TRUTH 133 (1878) . 
106 SeeP. GIDDINGS , supra note 91, a t 46; WE ARE YouR SISTERS, supra note 91, at 25 -
26, 58-61; D . WHITE, supra note 94, at 76- 90. 
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purchased freedom for their daughters and sisters . 107 Black women, 
along with Black men, succeeded remarkably often in maintaining the 
integrity of their family life despite slavery's disrupting effects. 108 
B. The Disproportionate Removal of Black Children 
The disproportionate number of Black mothers who lose custody 
of their children through the child welfare system is a contemporary 
manifestation of the devaluation of Black motherhood. 10 9 This dis-
parate impact of state intervention results in part from Black families ' 
higher rate of reliance on government welfare. 11 0 Because welfare 
familie s are subject to supervision by social workers, instances of 
perceived neglect are more likely to be reported to governmental 
107 See BLACK W o MEN IN WHITE AMERICA, supra note 99 , a t 40-42. This prac tice is 
poignantly described in the wo rds of a former slave named Anna Juli a Cooper in a speec h given 
m I 893 to the Congress of Representa tive Women: 
Yet a ll throu gh th e darkest period of the colored women's oppression in this country her 
yet un written hi story is full of heroic struggle , a struggle against fearful and overwhelmin g 
odds, tha t often ended in horrible death , to maintain a nd protec t that w hich woma n 
holds dearer tha n life. The painful , patien t, a nd sil en t toil of mothers to gain a fee 
simple title to the bodies of their daughters , the despa iring fi ght , as of a n entrap ped 
tigress, to keep ha llowed their ow n persons, would furni sh materia l for ep ics . 
BLACK W OM EN IN N INETE ENTH-CENTU RY AM ERI CAN LIF E 32 9 (B . Loewenberg & R. Bogin 
eds . I976) . 
108 See ge nerally H. GUTMAN, TH E BLACK FA MILY IN SLAVERY AN D FREEDO M, 17 90-19 25 
( I 976) (desc ribing the life of the Black fa mily durin g slavery); J ones, "!V! y iv! othe1· Was Jv!uch of 
a Woman": B lack Women , Work, and the Family Under Slavery , 8 F E!\!INIST STUD. 235, 252 -
6 I (r982 ) (describin g the sex ua l division of labor initiated by slaves within th eir own commu-
nities). 
10 9 See G ray & Ny bell , I ssues in Af rican-American Family Preservatio n , 69 C HILD \VELFA RE 
5 r 3, 51 3 (1990) (noting th a t about ha lf of the child ren in fos ter care a re Black); Hogan & Sin, 
Minorit y Children and the Chi ld Welfare System : An Historical Perspect ic'e, 33 Soc. W ORK 493 
(1988). O nce Blac k children enter foster care , they remain the re longer a nd receive less desira ble 
placements than w hite child ren ; they a re also less likely than w hite child re n to be return ed 
home or adopted. Se e B. M ANDELL, WHERE ARE TH E C HILDREN? A CLASS ANALYS IS OF 
FosTER CAR E AND ADOPTION 36 (1973); Gray & Nybell , supm, at 513- q ; Ste h no, Different ial 
Treatment of M in01·ity Ch ildren in Suvice Systems, 27 Soc. Wo RK 39, 39- 41 (rg82). T hese 
realities have led some Blac ks to dee m foster care a sys tem of legalized slavery. See B. 
MANDELL, supra, a t 6o. M alc olm X desc ribed th e state's d is ruption of his own family in these 
terms: 
Soon the state people we re makin g pla ns to ta ke ove r a ll of m y mothe rs' children . 
A Judge in La nsin g had a uthority ove r me a nd a ll of my brothe rs a nd siste rs. 
We we re "state children ," court wards; he had the full say-so ove r us . A white ma n in 
cha rge of a bl ac k ma n 's children ' Nothin g but legal , modern slavery - however kind ly 
intenti oned. 
I t ru ly believe that if ever a state social age ncy des troyed a fam il y, it destroyed ours. 
M . LITTLE, TH E AUTOB IOGRAPHY OF M ALCOLM X 20-2 I (196 5). 
11 0 See \Vald , supra note 53. a t 629 n.22. 
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authorities than neglect on the part of more affluent parents .111 Black 
children are also removed from their homes in part because of the 
child welfare system's cultural bias and application of the nuclear 
family pattern to Black families. 112 Black childrearing patterns that 
diverge from the norm of the nuclear family have been misinte rpreted 
by government bureaucrats as child neglect. 11 3 For example, child 
welfare workers have often failed to respect the longstanding cultural 
tradition in the Black community of shared parenting responsibility 
among blood-related and non-blood kin . 114 The state has thus been 
more willing to intrude upon the autonomy of poor Black families, 
and in particular of Black mothers, while protecting the integrity of 
white, middle-class homes.llS 
T his devaluation of Black motherhood has been reinforced by 
stereotypes that blame Black mothers for the problems of the Black 
family. T his scapegoating of Black mothers dates back to slavery, 
when mothers were blamed for the devastating effects on their chil-
dren of poverty and abuse of Black women. When a one-month-old 
slave girl named Harriet died in the Abbeville District of South Car-
olina on December 9, 1849 , the census marshal reported the cause of 
death as '"[s]mothered by carelessness of [her] mother."' 116 This report 
was typical of the United States census mortality schedules for the 
southern states in its attribution of a Black infant death to accidental 
suffocation by the mother. 117 Census marshal Charles M. Pelot ex-
plained: "'I wish it to be distinctly understood that nearly all the 
accidents occur in the negro population, which goes clearly to prove 
their great carelessness & total inability to take care of themselves. "' 11 8 
It now appears that the true cause of these suffocation deaths was 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. 119 Black children died at a dramat-
1: 1 See F alle r & Ziefert, supra note 6z , at 47; VI/aid, supra note 53, at 629 n .2I. For a 
discussion of the connection between the child w elfare system and poverty, see Jenkins, Ch ild 
Welfare as a Class System, in CHILDREN AND D ECENT PEOPLE 3- 4 (A . Schorr ed. I974l-
' 12 Cf Santosky v . Kramer, -t55 U.S. 745, 763 (r gSz) (notin g that termination proceedings 
"are often vulnerab le to judgments based on cultural or class bias"); Gray & Nybell, supm note 
rog, at 515-17; Stack, Cultural Perspect ives on Child Welfare, r2 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 539, 54 1 (r983-84). See genaallv A. BILLINGSLEY & J_ GIOVANNONI , CI-IJLDREN OF 
THE STORM (19721 (tracing the history of Black children in the American child welfare sys tem)_ 
:!3 S ee Gray & Nybe ll , supra note 109, at 515 - q; Stack, sup-ra note 11 2, at 54r. For 
descriptions of chil d rearing patte rn s in the Black community that are considered deviant, such 
as extended kin networks, seeR. H ILL, I NFORMAL ADOPTION AMONG B LACK fAMILIES (19/i); 
a nd C. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STR.>\TEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMU:--!ITY 62-107 
( 1974). 
114 S ee Stack , su.!Jra note r u , at 539-43-
115 Se e id. at 547-
11 6 J oh nson , supm no te ! , at 493 (quoting S. Cc.roiina Mortality Schedules, r 850, A bbeville 
Dist rict)_ 
117 S ee id. at 493-96. 
118 Id. at 49 5 (quoting S. C arolina lVIorta lity Sc hedules , r3s o, Abbeville District )_ 
119 See id. a l 496- soS; Savitt , Smothering and OveYlaying of Virginia Slave Children : A 
Sugge st ed Explanatio n , 49 BULL. HrsT. IviED. 400, 400 (1975L 
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ically higher rate because of the hard physical work, poor nutrition, 
and abuse that their slave mothers endured during pregnancy. 120 
The scapegoating of Black mothers has manifested itself more 
recently in the myth of the Black matriarch, the domineering female 
head of the Black family. White sociologists have held Black ma-
triarchs responsible for the disintegration of the Black family and the 
consequent failure of Black people to achieve success in America. 121 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan popularized this theory in his rg65 report, 
The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. 122 According to 
Moynihan: 
At the heart of the deterioration of the fabric of the Negro society is 
the deterioration of the Negro family. It is the fundamental cause of 
the weakness of the Negro community . . . . In essence, the Negro 
community has been forced into a matriarchal structure which, be-
cause it is so out of line with the rest of the American society, seriously 
retards the progress of the group as a whole. 123 
Thus, Moynihan attributed the cause of Black people's inability to 
overcome the effects of racism largely to the dominance of Black 
mothers. 
C. The Sterilization of Women of Color 
Coerced sterilization is one of the most extreme forms of control 
over a woman's reproductive life. By permanently denying her the 
right to bear children, sterilization enforces society's determination 
that a woman does not deserve to be a mother. Unlike white women, 
poor women of color have been subjected to sterilization abuse 124 for 
decades. 12 5 The disproportionate sterilization of Black women is yet 
120 See Johnson , supra note r , at so8- 2o . 
12 1 Se e P. GIDDINGS, supra note gr , at 325-35; B. HOOKS , supra note q , at 70-83; R. 
STAPLES, THE BLACK WO!VlAN IN A ME RICA I0- 34 (19 76) ; Bennett & G resha m , supra note Sg, 
a t I I?- IS. 
122 OFFICE OF PLAN NI NG & POLICY RESEARCH , U .S. DEP'T OF LABOR , THE N EGRO FAMI LY: 
THE CAS E FOR N ATIONAL ACTION ( I965 ). 
123 !d. a t s. 
124 "S te rilization a buse occurs w heneve r the sterilizat ion procedure is perfo rmed under con-
dition s th a t . pressure an individual into agree ing to be sterilize d , or obsc ure the r isks, 
consequences , a nd a lternatives assoc iated with steriliza tion ." Petc hesky, R eproduction , Ethics, 
and P ublic Policy: The FedeYal St erlization Regulati ons, 9 HASTINGS C ENTER R EP . 29, 32 
(19 79) ; see also N ote , S teri lizat ion A buse: Cur-rent S ta te of the Law and R em ed ies f or Ab use, 
ro GOLDEN GATE U. L. R Ev. r 147, II 52-5 3 (I g8o) (listin g ma ny co mm on situa ti ons of sterili za-
tion a buse). 
J25 S ee A. D AVIS, supra note g r . at 2 1)-21 ; N sia h-J efferson , R eproductive Laws , Wom en of 
Color, and Low -In come W omen, in REPROD UCTIV E LAWS FOR TH E I ggos, a t. 46- 47 (S. Co hen 
& N. T aub ed s. rg88) . O ne study fo und that 43% of women sterili zed in 1973 un de r a fe d erally 
funded program were Blac k , a lthough only 33 % of the pati ents we re Black. S ee N ote , su pm 
note 124, at 11 53 n .. )o . Spa nish-speakin g women a re twice as li ke ly to be ste ril ized as those 
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another manifestation of the dominant society's devaluation of Black 
women as mothers. 
Sterilization abuse has taken the form both of blatant coercion and 
trickery and of subtle influences on women's decisions to be steri-
lized.126 In the r 97os, some doctors conditioned delivering babies and 
performing abortions on Black women's consent to sterilization. 12 7 In 
a 1974 case brought by poor teenage Black women in Alabama, a 
federal district court found that an estimated roo,ooo to rso,ooo poor 
women were sterilized annually under federally-funded programs. 128 
Some of these women were coerced into agreeing to sterilization under 
the threat that their welfare benefits would be withdrawn unless they 
submitted to the operation. 129 Despite federal and state regulations 
intended to prevent involuntary sterilization, physicians and other 
health care providers continue to urge women of color to consent to 
sterilization because they view these women's family sizes as excessive 
and believe these women are incapable of effectively using other 
methods of birth control. 130 
Current government funding policy perpetuates the encouragement 
of sterilization of poor, and thus of mainly Black, women . The federal 
government pays for sterilization services under the M edicaid pro-
gram,131 while it often does not make available information about 
who speak English. See Levin & Taub, R ep?"O duclive R ights, in WOMEN AND THE L AW 
§ roA.o7[3][b], at 1oA-2 8 (C. Lefcourt ed. 1989). The racial disparity in sterilization cuts across 
economic and educational lines, althcugh the frequency of sterilization is generally higher among 
the poor and uneducated. Another study found that g. 7% of college-educated Black women 
had been sterilized, compared to 5.6% of college-educated white women. Among women without 
a high school diploma, 31.6% of Black women and 14.5% of white women had been sterili zed. 
See id. 
126 See Clarke, Subtle Forms of Sterilizatio n Abuse: A R eproducti1'e Rights Analys is , in 
TEST-TUBE WOMEN 120, 120-3 2 (R. Arditti , R. Klein & S. Minden eds. 1984); Nsiah-Jefferson , 
supra note 125, at 44-45 ; Petchesky, supra note 12 4, at 32 . 
12i S ee Nsiah-Jeffe rson , supra note 125, at 46-47. 
128 See Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp . II 96, 11 99 (D .D.C. 1974), on remand sub nom . 
Relf v. Mathews, 403 F. Supp. 123 5 (D. D.C. 1975), vacated su b nom. Relf v . Weinberger, 565 
F.zd 722 (D. C. Cir. 1977). 
129 See id . 
130 S ee Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 125, at 47- 48 ; see also Note, supra note 124 , at 1 rsg-
6o (noting the lack of any sanctions fo r noncompliance with federal sterilization regulations). 
In contrast to the encouragement of minority sterilization, our society views childbearing by 
white women as desirable. Ruth Calker te lls the story of a classmate of hers in law school who 
decided to be sterilized. The unive rsity ph ys ician refused to allow her to unde rgo the procedure 
unless she agreed to attend several sessions with a psychiatrist, presumably to dissuade her from 
her decision. See Calker. Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and 
Wis dom, 77 CA LIF . L. REv. 1011, ro67 n. 196 (1989). Coiker recognizes that the "physician's 
actions reflect the dominant sociai message - that a healthy (white) woman should want to 
bear a child ' ' I d . 
131 Subchapters XlX and XX of the Social Security Act provide matching funds for steril-
ization reimbursement. See 4 2 U.S.C. ~~ 1396a(1o)(A.). 1397a(a)(2) (1988). 
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and access to other contraceptive techniques and abortion. 132 In effect, 
sterilization is the only publicly-funded birth control method readily 
available to poor women of color. 
Popular images of the undeserving Black mother legitimate gov-
ernment policy as well as the practices of health care providers. The 
myth of the Black Jezebel has been supplemented by the contemporary 
image of the lazy welfare mother who breeds children at the expense 
of taxpayers in order to increase the amount of her welfare check. 133 
This view of Black motherhood provides the rationale for society's 
restrictions on Black female fertility. 134 It is this image of the unde-
serving Black mother that also ultimately underlies the government's 
choice to punish crack-addicted women. 
132 See Nsiah-J efferson, supra note I2 5, at 45-46; Petchesky, supra note 12 4, at 39; Note, 
supra note 124 , at I I 54· 
133 See Harrington, Introduction to S. SHEEHAN , A WELFARE M OTHER at x- xi (I976); 
MILWAUKEE COUNTY WELFARE RIGHTS 0RG., WELFARE MOTHERS SPEAK OUT 72 - 92 (1972). 
In a chapter entitled "Welfare Mythology," the Milwaukee Co unty Welfare Ri ghts Organization 
portrays a common image of welfare mothers: 
You give those lazy, shiftless good-for-nothings an inch and they'll take a mil e. You 
have to make it tou gher on them. They're getting away with murder now. You have 
to catch all those cheaters and put them to work or put them in jail. G et them off the 
welfare roils. I'm tired of those niggers coming to our state to ge t on welfare. I'm tired 
of paying their bills just so they can sit around home havi ng babies, watching their color 
tel evisions, and driving Cadillacs. 
I d. at 72 . Writers in the I98os claimed that welfare induces poor Black women to have babies. 
See, e.g .. C. MURRAY , LOSING GROUND I54- 66 (I984l. Other researchers have refuted this 
claim . See, e.g., Darity & Myers, Does Welfare Dependency Cause Female Headship? The Case 
of th e Black Family, 46 ]. MARRIAGE & FAM. 765, 773 (I984l (concluding that "[t]he attrac-
tiveness of welfare and welfare depe nden cy exhibit no effe cts on black femal e family heads"). 
134 This thinking was reflected in a re cent newspaper edito rial suggesting that Black women 
on welfare should be given in ce ntives to use Norplant , a TJ ew contraceptive. See Poverty and 
Norplant: Can Contraception Reduce the Undo·class?, Phil a. Inquirer, Dec. 12, I 990, at A18, 
col. r. On J a nuary 2 , r 99I , a California judge ordered a Black woman on welfare who was 
convi cted of child abuse to use Norplant for three years as a cond ition of probation . See Lev, 
Judge Is Firm on Forc ed Contraception , but Welcom es an Appeal , NY. Times, J an. II, 199I, 
at A q, col. I; see also Lewin, Implan ted Birth Control Device Renews Debate over Foned 
Contmception, N.Y. Times , Jan. IO, I991, at Azo col. I (reviewing the de bate on forced use 
of Norplant). The condemnation of sin gle mothers can also be seen as penalizi ng poor Black 
women for departing from white middle-class norms of motherhood. C). Chambers v. Omaha 
Girls Cl ub , 834 F.2d 697 (8 th Cir. 1987) (affirming di smissal of title VII action brought by an 
unmarried Black staff member of a private girls' club who was fir ed because she became 
pregnant). Regina Austin suggests that "young , sin gle, sexually active, fertil e . and nurturing 
black women are being viewed ominously because they have the te merity to attem pt to break 
out of the rigid economic, social , and political categories that a rac ist, sex ist , a nd class-stratified 
society would im pose u pon them." Austin, supm note I!f, at 555· 
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IV. PROSECUTING DRUG ADDICTS AS PuNISHMENT 
FOR HAVING BABIES 
1445 
Informed by the historical and present devaluation of Black moth-
erhood, we can better understand prosecutors' reasons for punishing 
drug-addicted mothers . This Article views such prosecutions as 
punishing these women, in essence, for having babies; judges such 
as the one who convicted Jennifer Johnson are pronouncing not 
so much "I care about your baby" as "You don't deserve to be a 
mother." 
It is important to recognize at the outset that the prosecutions are 
based in part on a woman's pregnancy and not on her illegal drug 
use alone. 135 Prosecutors charge these defendants not with drug use, 
but with child abuse or drug distribution - crimes that relate to their 
pregnancy. Moreover, pregnant women receive harsher sentences than 
drug-addicted men or women who are not pregnant.l36 
The unlawful nature of drug use must not be allowed to confuse 
the basis of the crimes at issue. The legal rationale underlying the 
prosecutions does not depend on the illegality of drug use. Harm to 
the fetus is the crux of the government's legal theory. Criminal 
charges have been brought against women for conduct that is legal 
but was alleged to have harmed the fetus. 137 
When a drug-addicted woman becomes pregnant, she has only one 
realistic avenue to escape criminal charges: abortion. 138 Thus, she is 
penalized for choosing to have the baby rather than having an abor-
tion. In this way, the state's punitive action may coerce women to 
have abortions rather than risk being charged with a crime. Thus, it 
is the choice of carrying a pregnancy to term that is being penalized. l39 
135 At Jennifer Johnson's sentencing, the prosecutor made clear the nature of the charges 
against her: "About the end of December 1988, our office undertook a policy to begin to 
deal with mothers !ike Jennifer Johnson as in the status of a child abuse case, 
Your Honor. We have never v iewe d th is as a dntg case." Motion for Rehearing and 
Sentencing at 12, State v. Johnson, No. E89-89o-C FA (Fla. C ir. Ct. Aug. 25, 1989) (emphasis 
added) 
136 The drug use r's pregnancy not only greatly increases the likelihood that she will be 
prosec uted, but also greatl y enhances the penalty she faces upon conviction. In most states, 
drug use is a misdemeanor, while distribution of drugs is a felony. See Hoffman , supra notes , 
at 44-
13i Pamela Rae Stewart, for example, was charged with criminal neglect in part because she 
failed to follow her doctor's orders to stay off her feet and refrain from sexual intercourse while 
she was pregnant. See People v. Stewart, No. Mso8r97, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 
1987); Bonavoglia, The Ordeal of Pamela Rae Stewart, Ms., Jul./Aug. 1987, at 92, 92. 
138 Seeking drug treatment is not a viable alternative. First , it is likely that the pregnant 
addict will he unabl e to find a drug treatment program that will accept her. See infra notes 
IS r- rss and accompanying text. Second, even if she successfully completes drug counseling by 
th e end of her pregnancy, she may sti ll be prosecuted for her drug use that occurred during 
pregnancy before she was able to overcome her addiction. 
139 I recogniz e that both becoming pregnant and continu ing a pregnancy to term are not 
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There is also good reason to question the government's justification 
for the prosecutions - the concern for the welfare of potential chil-
dren. I have already discussed the selectivity of the prosecutions with 
respect to poor Black women. 140 This focus on the conduct of one 
group of women weakens the state's rationale for the prosecutions. 
The history of overwhelming state neglect of Black children casts 
further doubt on its professed concern for the welfare of the fetus. 
When a society has always closed its eyes to the inadequacy of prenatal 
care available to poor Black women, its current expression of interest 
in the health of unborn Black children must be viewed with suspicion. 
The most telling evidence of the state's disregard of Black children is 
the high rate of infant death in the Black community. In I 987 , the 
mortality rate for Black infants in the United States was I7 .g deaths 
per thousand births- more than twice that for white infants (8.6). 141 
In New York City, while infant mortality rates in upper- and middle-
income areas were generally less than nine per thousand in I g86, the 
rates exceeded nineteen in the poor Black communities of the South 
Bronx and Bedford-Stuyvesant and reached 2 7. 6 in Central Har-
lem.142 
The main reason for these high mortality rates is inadequate pre-
natal care. 143 Most poor Black women face financial and other bar-
necessarily real "choices" that women - particularly women of color and addicted women -
make . Rape, battery, Jack of available contraceptives, and prostitution induced by drug addic-
tion may lead a woman to become pregnant without exercising meaningful choice. Similarly, 
coercion from the father or her famil y, lack of money to pay for an abortion, or other barriers 
to access to an abortion m ay force a woman to continue an unwa nted pregnancy. See infra 
note 2 11. 
Nevertheless, these constraints on a woma n's choice do not justify the governm ent's punish-
ment of the reproductive co urse that she ultimately foll ows. While we work to create the 
conditions for meanin gful reproductive choice, it is important to affirm women's right to be free 
from unwanted state intrusion in their reproductive decisions. 
140 See supra pp. 1432-36. 
14 1 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMM ERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATI STICAL ABSTRACT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 77 (table IIO) (1990). This means that in 1987 , Black children were 2.08 
times more likely than white children to die before reaching 0:1e year of age. This is the largest 
gap between Black and white infant mortality rates since r 940, when infant mortality data were 
first reported by race. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, supm note 79, at 3· 
142 See F. CARO, D. KALMUSS & I. LOPEZ, BARRIERS TO PRENATAL CARE I (1988). Another 
example of the institutionali zed deval uation of Biack life is race-of-the-victim sentencing dis-
parities. See Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 
IOI HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1388-90 (!988). 
!43 See Binsacca, Ellis, Martin & Petitti , Factors Associated with Low Birthweight in an 
Inner-City Population: The Role of Financial Problems, 77 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH sos, 505 
(1987); Leveno, Cunningham, Roark, Nelson & Williams, Prenatal Care and the Low Birth 
Weight Infa nt, 66 OBSTETRICS & GYN . 599 , 6o2 (1985). Babies born to wome n who receive no 
prenatal care a re three times more likely to die within the first year than those born to women 
who receive adeq uate care. See Hughes, Johnson , Rosenbaum & Simons, The Health of Amer-
ica's Mothers and Children: Trends in Access to Care, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REv . 472, 473 (1986) . 
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riers to rece1vmg proper care during pregnancy. 144 In r g86, only half 
of all pregnant Black womeri in America received adequate prenatal 
care. 145 It appears that in the r g8os Black women's access to prenatal 
care has actually declined. 146 The government has chosen to punish 
poor Black women rather than provide the means for them to have 
healthy children. 
144 One of the most significant obstacles to receiving prenatal care is the inability to pay for 
health care services. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, supra note i9, at 43-48; McNulty, supra 
note 8, at 295-9i. Most poor women depend on overextended public hospitals for prenatal care 
because of the scarcity of neighborhood physicians who accept Medicaid. See id. Institutional, 
cultural, and educational barriers also deter poor women of color from using the few available 
services. See generally F. CARO, D. KALMUSS & I. LOPEZ, supra note 142 (discussing institu-
tional and cultural barriers to prenatal care among low-income women in New York City); 
Curry, Nonfinancial Barriers to Prenatal Care, rs WOMEN & HEALTH 8S-8i (1989) (discussing 
accessibility problems to needed health care sites); Zambrana, A Research Agenda on Issues 
Affecting Poor and Minority Women: A Model for Understanding Their Health Needs, 14 
WOMEN & HEALTH I37, I48-5o (1988) (discussing cultural barriers to prenatal care). A Haitian 
woman's explanation of why she discontinued prenatal care illustrates these obstacles to the use 
of public health facilities: 
My friend say go to doctor and get checked. . . My friend be on the phone much 
time before they make appointment. They no have space for 30 days. 
When I go to hospital, it confusing. . . I go early, and see doctor late in the 
afternoon. I wait on many long lines and take lots of tests. I no understand why 
so many test every time. No one explain nothing. No one talk my language. I be tired, 
feel sick from hospital. I go three times, but no more. Too much trouble for nothing. 
F. CARO, D. KALMUSS & I. LOPEZ, supra note 142, at iS-j6. 
1-1 5 See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE fUND, supra note i9, at 4 (table I. I). The percentage of 
white women receiving adequate prenatal care was 72.6. See id. 
14 6 See Hughes, Johnson, Rosenbaum & Simons, supra note 143, at 4i3-74; lVlcNulty, supra 
note 8, at 2 93-94. 
The percentage of Black women receiving prenatal care in the first three months of pregnancy 
declined from a high of 62. i in I980 to 6r. I in I988. See Hilts, Life Expectancy for Blacks in 
U.S. Shows Sharp Drop, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1990, at Bq, col. r. The percentage of babies 
born to Black women getting no prenatal care increased from 8.8 in I980 to II.O in 1988. See 
id. 
The number of Black infant deaths could be reduced significantly by a national commitment 
to ensuring that all pregnant women receive high-quality prenatal care. See generally Leu, 
Legislaiive Research Bureau Report: A Proposal to Strengthen State Measures for the Reduction 
of Infant ivlortality, 23 HARV. ]. LEGIS. 559 (I986) (proposing methods for delivering prenatal 
care services to poor women). A recently revealed confidential draft of a report by the ·white 
House Task Force on Infant Mortality recommends 18 specific measures costing a total of $480 
million per year to reduce infant mortality. "The steps include expansion of Medicaid to cover 
r 20,000 additional pregnant women and children in low-income families, an increase in Federal 
spending on prenatal care and a requirement for states to provide a uniform set of Medicaid 
benefits to pregnant women." Pear, Study Says U.S. Needs to Attack Infant Mortality, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 6, 1990, at B9, col. 3· Programs specifically designed to provide prenatal care to 
low-income, high-risk women have succeeded in substantially reducing the rates of low birth-
weight and high infant mortality. See F. CARO, D. KALMUSS & I. LOPEZ, supra note 142, at 
3-5. For discussions of recommendations of measures to increase the use of prenatal care by 
poor women, see id. at 85-99; and Poland, Ager & Olson, supra note 45, at 303. 
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The cruelty of this punitive response is heightened by the lack of 
available drug treatment services for pregnant drug addicts. 14 7 Pro-
tecting the welfare of drug addicts' children requires, among other 
things, adequate facilities for the mother's drug treatment. Yet a drug 
addict's pregnancy serves as an obstacle to obtaining this treatment. 
Treatment centers either refuse to treat pregnant women or are effec-
tively closed to them because the centers are ill-equipped to meet the 
needs of pregnant addicts. 148 Most hospitals and programs that treat 
addiction exclude pregnant women because their babies are more 
likely to be born with health problems reqmnng expens1ve 
care. 149 Program directors also feel that treating pregnant addicts is 
worth neither the increased cost nor the risk of tort liability. lSO 
Moreover, there are several barriers to pregnant women who seek 
to use centers that will accept them. Drug treatment programs are 
generally based on male-oriented models that are not geared to the 
needs of women. 151 The lack of accommodations for children is per-
haps the most significant obstacle to treatment. M ost outpatient clin-
ics do not provide child care, and many residential treatment programs 
do not admit children. 152 Furthermore, treatment programs have 
147 See Chavkin, Drug Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy CYOssroads, So AM.]. PuB. HEALTH 
483, 485 (I990); McNulty, supm note 8, at 30I-02. A I979 national survey by the National 
Institute on Drug Abuse found only 25 drug treatment programs that described themselves as 
specifically geared to female addicts. See Chavkin, supra, at 485. The lack of facilities for 
pregnant addicts in two cities illustrates the problem. A recent survey of 78 drug treatment 
programs in New York City revealed that 54% denied treatment to pregnant women, 67% 
refused to treat pregnant addicts on Medicaid, and 87% excluded pregnant women on Medicaid 
addicted specifically to crack. Less than half of those programs that did accept pregnant addicts 
provided prenatal care, and only two provided child care. Su Chavkin, Help, Don't Jail, 
Addicted Mothers, N.Y. Times, July IS, I 989, at Az I, col. 2. Similarly, drug-addicted mothers 
in San Diego must wait up to six months to obtain one of just 26 places in residential treatment 
programs that allow them to live with their children. See Schachter, Help Is Hard to Find for 
Addict Mothers: Drug Us e "Epidemic" Overwhelms Services, L.A. Times, Dec. 12, 1986, pt. 
2, at I, col. I; Substance Abuse Treatment for Women: Crisis in Access, Health Advoc., Spring 
1989, at 9, col. r. Furthermore, because Medicaid covers only Ii days of a typical 28-day 
program, poor women may not be able to afford full treatment even at centers that will accept 
them. See Hoffman, supra note 5, at 44-
148 See Cusky, Berger & Densen-Gerber, Issues in the TYeatment of Female Addiction: A 
Review and Critique of the LiteratuYe, 6 CoNTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 307, 324-26 (I977); McNulty, 
supm note 8, at 30I-02; Suffet, Hutson & Brotman, Treatment of the PYegnant Addict: A 
Historical OveYview, in PREGNANT ADDICTS AND THEIR CHILDREN: A COMPREHENSIVE CARE 
APPROACH I3, 21 (R. Brotman, D. Hutson & F. Suffet eds. 1984); Alters, supra note 30, at I, 
col. r; Freitag, Hospital Defends Limiting of Drug Program, N.Y. Times, Dec. r 2, 1989, 2.t B9, 
col. 1. 
149 See McNulty, supra note 8, at 30I; Teltsch, supra note 30, at A14, col. r. 
150 See Chavkin, DYug Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy CYossroads, supra note I47, at 485; 
McNulty, Combatting Pregnancy Discrimination in Access to Substance A buse Treatment for 
Low-Income Women, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 2 I, 22 (1989). 
151 See Cuskey, Berger & Dcnsen-Gerber, supm note q8, at 312-14; A.!ters, suprrJ note 30, 
at r, col. I. 
152 See l\1cl'Iulty, sup-ra note rso, at 22; Substance Abuse TYec t:-nent for ~Vo :-."t. .en: Crisis in 
Access, supra note 147, at g. 
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traditionally failed to provide the comprehensive services that women 
need, including prenatal and gynecologic care, contraceptive counsel-
ing, appropriate job training, and counseling for sexual and physical 
abuse .15 3 Predominantly male staffs and clients are often hostile to 
female clients and employ a confrontational style of therapy that 
makes many women uncomfortable. 154 Moreover, long waiting lists 
make treatment useless for women who need help during the limited 
duration of their pregnancies. 155 
F inally, and perhaps most importantly, ample evidence reveals that 
prosecuting addicted mothers may not achieve the government's as-
serted goal of healthier pregnancies; indeed, such prosecutions will 
probably lead to the opposite result. Pregnant addicts who seek help 
from public hospitals and clinics are the ones most often reported to 
government authorities. 15 6 The threat of prosecution based on this 
reporting forces women to remain anonymous and thus has the per-
verse effect of deterring pregnant drug addicts from seeking treat-
ment. 15 7 For this reason, the government's decision to punish drug-
addic ted mothers is irreconcilable with the goal of helping them. 
15.3 See C havkin, Dntg Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy Crossroads, supra note 14 7, at 485 ; 
Chavkin, D river & Forman, The Crisis in N ew York City's Perinatal Services , 89 N.Y. ST.]. 
MED. 6s8, 661 - 62 (1989). 
154 See Chavkin , Drug Addictio n and Pregnan cy: Policy Crossroads , supra note 147, at 485; 
see also NATION AL I NSTITUTE ON D RUG ABUSE, DRUG DEPENDE NCY IN PREGNANCY 4 6 (1978) 
(desc ri bing pe rvasive negati ve a ttitu des toward pregnant addicts). 
155 T he experie nce of one Black pregnant dru g addict , whom I will call Mary, exemplifies 
the barr iers to care. Mary needed to fi nd a residential drug treatment program that prov ided 
prena tal care a nd accommodations fo r her two children, ages three and eight. She tried to get 
into H . U .G .S . (Hope , Unity and Growth ), the sole residential treatment progra m for women 
with children in Detroit, but there was no vacancy. Mary's only so urce of public prenatal care 
was E leanor Hutzel Hospital, which has a clinic for high risk pregna ncies. She was also able 
to receive dru g counseling on an outpatient basis from the adjace nt E leanore Hutzel Recovery 
Ce nter. But Mary encountered a n eight-week waiting list at the hospital, and inadequate public 
transportation made it extremely d iffic ult for her to get there. In the end, she rece ived defici ent 
care for both her addiction and her pregnancy. T elephone Interv iew with Adrie nne Edmonson-
Smith , Advocate with the M a terna l-C hild H ealth Ad vocacy Project , Wayne State Unive rsity 
(J uly 25, 1990). 
156 See Berrien, Pregnancy and Drug Use : The Dangerous and Unequal Use of P unitive 
Measures, 2 YALE J.L. & FEM IN ISM 239, 247 (1990). 
T he govern ment learned of Jennifer Jo hnso n's crack addiction only because she conf,ded her 
addiction to the obstetrician who delivered her baby at a public hospital. Her trust in her 
doctor prompted the hospital to test Johnso n and her baby for drugs. See Brief of American 
P ubli c Health Assoc iation and Oth er Co nce rned Organizations as Amici Curi ae in Support of 
Appellan t at 2, Johnson v. State, No . 89-1765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 1989) . Moreove r, 
t he state's entire p roof of Johnson 's crim ina l in tent was based on the th eory that Johnso n's 
attem pts to get help for her addiction showed tha t she knew tha t her cocaine use ha rmed the 
fetu s. T he key evidence against her was th a t, a month before her daughte r's bi rth , J ohnson 
had summoned a n ambulance after a crack binge because she was worried abo ut its effect on 
her unborn chi ld. See Trial Transc ript, supra note 4 , at 144. 
157 See American rvl edical Association. R.epo 1·t of th e Board of TYUsle es on Lega l lnte ;-;_•e n tions 
During Pregna;zcy : Court Orde red M edical Treahne nis and L egal Penalti es for Potent ially Hann-
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Pregnancy may be a time when women are most motivated to seek 
trea tment for drug addiction and make positive lifestyle changes.1ss 
The government should capitalize on this opportunity by encouraging 
drug-addicted women to seek help and providing them with compre-
hensive treatment. Punishing pregnant women who use drugs only 
exacerbates the causes of addiction - poverty, lack of self-esteem, 
and hopelessness. 159 Perversely, this makes it more likely that poor 
Black women's children - the asserted beneficiaries of the prosecu-
tions - will suffer from the same hardships. 
V. PUNISHING BLACK MOTHERS AND THE 
PERPETUATION OF RACIAL HIERARCHY 
The previous Part showed how recent prosecutions have penalized 
Black women for their reproductive choices based in part on society's 
devaluation of Black motherhood. This analysis implicates two con-
stitutional protections: the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment and the right of privacy. These two constitutional chal-
lenges appeal to different but related values. They are related160 in 
the sense that underlying the protection of the individual's autonomy 
is the principle that all individuals are entitled to equal dignity. 161 A 
basic premise of equality doctrine is that certain fundamental aspects 
of the human personality, including decisional autonomy, must be 
respected in all persons. 162 Theories of racial equality and privacy 
can be used as related means to achieve a common end of eliminating 
ful BehavioY by Pregnant Women, 264]. A.M.A. 2663, z66g (rggo). The reaction of pregnant 
women in San Diego to the rg87 arrest of Pamela Rae Stewart for harming her unborn child 
illustrates the deterrent effect of prosecution. Health care professionals reported that their 
pregnant clients' fear of prosecution for drug use made some of them distrustful and caused 
others to decline prenatal care altogether. See Moss, supm note 49, at I4II-I2. 
158 See Note, supm note sr, at 766 & n.84; Chavkin, Help, Don't Jail, Addicted Mothers, 
supra note 147 at A2 I, col. 2. 
159 See Escamilla-lYiondanaro, Women: Pregnancy, Children and Addiction, 9 J- PsYCHE-
DELIC DRUGS 59, 59-60 (I977l; see also Zuckerman, Amaro, Bauchner & Cabral, Depressive 
Symptoms During Pregnancy: Relationship to Poor II ealth Behaviors, r 6o AM. J- OBSTETRICS 
& GYN. II07, II09 (rg8g) (stating that poor health behavior in pregnancy correlates with such 
characteristics as "being single, older, unemployed, and having a lower income")_ 
160 See A. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A fREE SOCIETY 57-81 (rg88) 
(noting similarity between benefits of privacy and equality for women). But see Sunstein, Sexual 
01·ientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal 
Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. rr6r, rqo-79 (rg88) (discussing differences between due process 
liberty and equal protection). Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf criticize Professor Sunstein for 
failing to "take greater account of the inseparability of liberty and equality." Tribe & Dorf, 
Levels ofGenerality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U CHI. L. REv. I057, rogs (rggo). 
i6I See Karst, The Supreme Court, r976 Term - Foreword: Equal Citizenship Undn the 
.F01ateenth Amendment, 9I HARV. L. REv. I, 32 (I977l-
I62 SeeR_ DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-78 (I977l-
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the legacy of racial discrimination that has devalued Black mother-
hood. Both aim to create a society in which Black women's repro-
ductive choices, including the decision to bear children, are given full 
respect and protection. 
The equal protection clause 163 embodies the Constitution's ideal of 
racial equality. State action that violates this ideal by creating clas-
sifications based on race must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. 164 
The equal protection clause, however, does not explicitly define the 
meaning of equality or delineate the nature of prohibited government 
conduct. As a result, equal protection analyses generally have divided 
into two visions of equality: one that is informed by an antidiscrimi-
nation principle, the other by an antisubordination principle. 165 
T he antidiscrimination approach identifies the primary threat to 
equality as the government's "failure to treat Black people as individ-
uals without regard to race. "166 The goal of the antidiscrimination 
principle is to ensure that all members of society are treated in a 
color-blind or race-neutral fashion . Under this view of equality, the 
function of the equal protection clause is to outlaw specific acts com-
mitted by individual government officials that discriminate against 
individual Black complainants because of their race. T hus, this ap-
proach judges the legitimacy of government action from the perpetra-
tor's perspective. 167 T he analysis focuses on the process by which 
government decisions are made and seeks to purge racial classifications 
from that process. 
The Supreme Court's current understanding of the equal protection 
clause is based on a narrow interpretation of the antidiscrimination 
principle. 168 The Court has confined discrimination prohibited by the 
163 The fourteenth amendment provides, in relevant part , that "[n]o State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the eq ual protection 
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § r. 
164 Racial classifications are held unconstitutional absent a compelling governmental just ifi-
cation. See Wygant v. Jackson Bel. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opinion) ; 
Palmore v. Sidoti , 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 
(1944). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICA N CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § I6-6, at I45I-54 (2d ed. 
r g88) (explaining the strict scrutiny standard). 
165 These competing views of equal protection law have been variously characterized by 
commentators. See , e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note I64, § r6-2r, at 1514-2I (describing the "anti-
discrimination" and "antisubjugation" principles); Brest, Th e Supreme Court, 1975 Term -
Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, go HARV. L. REv. r, 5 (1976) 
(advocating the antidiscrimination principle as a theory of racial justice); Colker, Anti-Subor-
dination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection , 6r N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1005-13 (rg86) 
(comparing the "anti-differentiation" principle with the "anti-subordination" approach). 
!66 Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle - Toward a Constitutional Standard for Review of 
Race Cases, 30 WAYNE L. REV. I, I (I983). 
16i See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Ti11"ough Antidiscrimination Law : .4 
Critical Review of Supreme Cou·rt Doc trine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 , 1052-57 (1978). 
168 See Strauss, Discriminatory I ntent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CH I. L. REv. 935, 
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Constitution to state conduct performed with a discriminatory in-
tent. 169 State conduct that disproportionately affects Blacks violates 
the Constitution only if it is accompanied by a purposeful desire to 
produce this outcome. 170 Although recognized violations are not lim-
ited to explicit racial classifications, an invidious purpose cannot be 
inferred solely from the adverse consequences of racially neutral pol-
icies.171 A Black complainant, therefore, need not produce a law that 
expressly differentiates between whites and Blacks; but neither can 
she simply demonstrate that a color-blind law has a clearly dispro-
portionate impact on Blacks. As one commentator has noted, "the 
Justices have demanded proof ... that officials were 'out to get' a 
person or group on account of race. "172 
Black women prosecuted for drug use during pregnancy never-
theless may be able to make out a prima facie case of dis-
criminatory purpose . 173 The Court has recognized that a 
selection process characterized by broad government discretion 
that produces unexplained racial disparities may support the 
presumption of discriminatory purpose .1 74 In Castaneda v. 
95 3-54 (1989). For an analysis of the development of Supreme Court antidiscrimination doctrin e, 
see Dimond, supra note 166 , a t 16-42 ; and Freeman , supra note 167, at 1057-II18. 
169 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. M etropolitan H ous. Dev. Corp. , 42 9 U .S. 252, 
265 (197 7) ; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239- 45 (1976). 
Commentators have noted that the Court adopted the disc riminatory intent rule not because 
this standard is inherently required by the equal protection clause, but because it feared th e 
remedies a discriminatory impact rule would enta il. See , e.g., Binion , Intent and E qual Pro-
tec tion: A Reconsideration , 1983 SuP. CT . REv. 397, 404- 08; Kennedy, supra note 142, at 1414 
(noting Justice Brennan 's derision of the Court's "fea r of too much justice ") ; Schwe mm , From 
Washington to Arlington H eights and Beyond: Discrim inatory Purpose in Equ al Protection 
Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 96 1, 1050. 
1 iO Freeman recognizes in the Court's discriminatory intent standard the twin notions of 
"fault" and "causation": proof of an equal protection violation requires identifica.tion of a blame-
worthy perpetrator whose ac tions can be linked to th e v ictim 's injury. See Freeman , su pra note 
r67, at ros4-56 ; see also Sullivan , The Supreme Cou·rt , r985 Term - Commen t: Sins of 
DiscriminatiiJn : Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, roo HARV . L. REv. 78, 8o (1986) (arguing 
th at "the Court has approved affirma ti ve action only as precise penance for the specific sins of 
racism a government , union , or empl oyer has committed in the past") . 
Ii i S ee Personnel Adm'r v. Fee ney, 442 U.S . 256, 279 (1979); Kennedy, supra note 142, at 
1404. 
I i2 Kennedy, supm note 142, at r405. 
I i3 For a discussion of equal protection challenges to racially selective prosec utions, see 
D evelopments in the Law - Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1472, 1532-
49 (1 988) [hereinafter D eve lopments]. 
I i 4 See Kennedy, supra note 142, at 1425-2 7. S ee gen erally N ote , To Infer or Not to infe r 
a Discriminatory Purpose: R ethink ing Equal Prot ect ion D octrine, 61 N .Y.U . L. REv. 334, 351-
62 (1986) (discussing th e impac t-inferenc e standa rd as ap plied to ju ry selection and advocatin g 
its extension to death pe nalty cases and other contexts). The cases in which the Supreme Court 
has applied this reasoning in volve challenges to the rac ia l composition of juries . Se e, e.g . , 
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, soo-or (1977); Tu rner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360- 61 
(1970) . The Court has not been willing to extend this reasoning to oth er claims of rac ial 
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Partida, 175 for example , the Court held that the defendant demon-
stra ted a prima facie case of intentional discrimination in grand jury 
selection by showing a sufficiently large statistical disparity between 
the percentage of Mexican-Americans in the population (seventy-nine 
percent) and the percentage of those summoned (thirty-nine percent), 
combined with a selection procedure that relied on the discretion of 
jury commissioners. 176 
Similarly, a Black mother arrested in Pinellas County, Florida 
could make out a prima facie case of unconstitutional racial discrim-
ination by showing that a disproportionate number of those chosen 
for prosecution for exposing newborns to drugs are Black. In partic-
ular, she could point out the disparity between the percentage of 
defendants who are Black and the percentage of pregnant substance 
abusers w ho are Black. 177 The N ew England 1 ournal of Medicine 
study of pregnant women in Pinellas County referred to earlier found 
that only about twenty-six percent of those who used drugs were 
Black . 17S Yet over ninety percent of Florida prosecutions for drug 
abuse during pregnancy have been brought against Black women .179 
T he defendant could buttress her case with the study's finding that, 
despite similar rates of substance abuse, Black women were ten times 
more likely than white w om en to be reported to public health au-
thorit ies for substance abuse during pregnancy. 180 In addition, the 
defendant could show that both health care professionals and prose-
cutors wield a great deal of discretion in selecting women to be 
subj ected to the criminal justice system. 18 1 T he burden would then 
shift to the state "to dispel the inference of intentional d iscrimination" 
by justifying the racial disc repancy in its prosecutions. 182 
T he a ntisubordination approach to equality would not require 
Black defendants to prove that the prosecutions are motivated by 
racial bias . Rather than requiring victims to p rove distinct instances 
of discriminating behavior in the administra tive process, 183 the anti-
d iscrimi nation in t he ad m inistration of crimin al j ustice . See Cardinale & Feldman , The Federal 
Couds and the R ight to Nondiscriminatory Administration of the Criminal L aw: A Critical 
View , 29 SYRACUSE L. REv. 659, 662 - 64 (1978); Kennedy, supra note r.:p , a t 1402 (observi ng 
tha t "no defendant in state or federal court has ever successfully challenged h is punishment on 
g1·ounds of racial d iscrimination in se ntencing") (emphasis in original). 
liS 430 U.S . 482 (1977). 
li 6 Se e id . at 494-97. 
17 i See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S . 279, 349- 61 (1987) (B lac kmun ,]., dissenting) (applyin g 
th e Cas taneda tes t to a cla im of discrim inatory prosecution); Developments, supra note 17 3, at 
1552-54 (advocating use of an impact-infe rence sta ndard in the racial prosec ution co ntex t). 
178 See Chasnoff, Landress & Barrett, supra note 65, at 12 04 (table 2). 
179 See State Case Summary, supra note 2, at 3- 5. 
180 See supra p. 1434. 
13 1 See supra p. 1433· 
182 Castaneda v. Partida , 430 U.S. 482, 497- 98 (1977 ). 
J83 See Binion, supya note r69, at 407-08 
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subordination approach considers the concrete effects of government 
policy on the substantive condition of the disadvantaged. 184 This 
perspective recognizes that racial subjugation is not maintained solely 
through the racially antagonistic acts of individual officials. 185 It 
instead views social patterns and institutions that perpetuate the in-
ferior status of Blacks as the primary threats to equality. The goal of 
antisubordination law is a society in which each member is guaranteed 
equal respect as a human being. Under this conception of equality, 
the function of the equal protection clause is to dismantle racial hi-
erarchy by eliminating state action or inaction that effectively pre-
serves Black subordination. 186 
The prosecution of drug-addicted mothers demonstrates the inad-
equacy of antidiscrimination analysis and the superiority of the anti-
subordination approach. Rather than conform Black women's expe-
riences to the intent standard, we can use those experiences to reveal 
the narrowmindedness of the Court's view of equality. F irst, the 
antidiscrimination approach may not adequately protect Black women 
from prosecutions' infringement of equality, because it is difficult to 
identify individual guilty actors. Who are the government officials 
motivated by racial bias to punish Black women? The hospital staff 
who test and report mothers to child welfare agencies? The prose-
cutors who develop and implement policies to charge women who use 
drugs during pregnancy? Legislators who enact laws protecting the 
unborn? 
It is unlikely that any of these individual actors intentionally sin-
gled out Black women for punishment based on a conscious deval-
uation of their motherhood. The disproportionate impact of the pros-
ecutions on poor Black women does not result from such isolated, 
individualized decisions. Rather, it is a result of two centuries of 
systematic exclusion of Black women from tangible and intangible 
benefits enjoyed by white society. Their exclusion is reflected in Black 
women's reliance on public hospitals and public drug treatment cen-
ters, in their failure to obtain adequate prenatal care, in the more 
184 See Kennedy, supm note 142 , at 1424-25. 
ISS S ee L. TRIBE , su pra note r64 , § r6- zr, at rsr 8 , 1520- z r. 
ISo See \Vest, Progress ive and Consavative Co nst itu tio nalism , supm note q , at 693- 94 . 
P rofessor Tribe and others have argued that the antisubordin ation view of equality is more 
faithful to the historical origins of the Civil War amendments, which were drafted spec ifi cally 
to eradicate racial hierarchy. See L. TRIBE , supm note 164, § r6-zr, at rsr6; Freeman , supra 
note r67 , at ro6r. In the C ivil Ri ghts Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (r883), for example, the Court asse rted 
that th e thirteenth amendment aboli shes "all badges a nd incidents of slavery." I d . at zo. In 
th e Sla ughter-House Cases, 83 US . (r6 Wall. ) 36 (1873) , the Court identified as the "one 
pervading purpose" of the a mendments "the freedom of the slave race , the sec uri ty and firm 
esta blishment of that freedom , a nd the protection of the newly-made fre ema n and citize n from 
th e opp ressions of those who had formerl y exercised unli mited dominion over him ." I d. a t 7 I. 
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frequent reporting of Black drug-users by health care professionals, 
and in society's acquiescence in the government's punitive response to 
the problem of crack-addicted babies. 
More generally, the antidiscrimination principle mischaracterizes 
the role of social norms in perpetuating inequality. This view of 
equality perceives racism as disconnected acts by individuals who 
operate outside of the social fabric. 187 The goal of the equal protection 
clause under this world view is "to separate from the masses of society 
those blameworthy individuals who are violating the otherwise shared 
norm. "188 
The prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers demonstrate how dra-
matically this perspective departs from reality. It is precisely a shared 
societal norm - the devaluation of Black motherhood - that per-
petuates the social conditions discussed above and explains why Black 
women are particularly susceptible to prosecution. The Court's vision 
of equality acquiesces in racist norms and institutions by exempting 
them from a standard that requires proof of illicit motive on the part 
of an individual governmental actor. The inability to identify and 
blame an individual government actor allows society to rationalize the 
disparate impact of the prosecutions as the result of the mothers' own 
irresponsible actions. Formal equality theory thus legitimates the sub-
ordination of Black women . 
In contrast to the antidiscrimination approach, antisubordination 
theory mandates that equal protection law concern itself with the 
concrete ways in which government policy perpetuates the inferior 
status of Black women. T he law should listen to the voices of poor 
Black mothers and seek to eliminate their experiences of subordina-
tion. F rom this perspective , the prosecutions of crack-addic ted moth-
ers are unconsti tutional because they reinforce the myth of the unde-
serving Black mother by singling out - whether intentionally or not 
- Black women for punishment. The government's punitive policy 
reflects a long history of denigration of Black mothers dating back to 
slavery, and it serves to perpetuate that legacy of unequal respect. 
The prosecutions should therefore be upheld only if the state can 
demonstrate that they serve a compelling interest that could not be 
achieved through less discriminatory means. 189 
Although the state 's asserted interest in ensuring the health of 
babies is substantial, prosecution does not advance that interest in a 
sufficiently narrow fashion. F irst, as I have noted, the govermn.ent's 
187 See Freema n, supra note r67, at 1054. Kimberle C renshaw similarly demonstrates how 
the "rest rictive view" of antidiscrimination law ass umes that a racial ly eq uitable society already 
exists. C renshaw, supra note 14, a t !344· 
ISS F reeman , supra note 16 7, at I05 4· 
189 See Binion, supra note r69, at 447~48 
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punitive course of action is inimical to the goal of healthier pregnancies 
because it deters women from seeking help. 19° In addition, even if 
the prosecutions could be proved to further the state 's interest in 
children's welfare, they would not survive the "least restrictive alter-
native" standard. That standard requires that "even though the gov-
ernmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot 
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties 
when the end can be more narrowly achieved. "191 A public commit-
ment to providing adequate prenatal care for poor women and drug 
treatment programs that meet the needs of pregnant addicts would be 
a more effective means for the state to address the problem of drug-
exposed babies.192 
By prosecuting crack-addicted mothers, the government helps to 
perpetuate the dominant society's devaluation of Black motherhood. 
The antisubordination analysis better uncovers this institutional, 
rather than individualistic, mechanism for maintaining racial inequal-
ity. The government's policy cannot withstand the scrutiny of an 
equality jurisprudence dedicated to eradicating hierarchies of racial 
privilege. Still, the focus purely on equality does not address the 
unique significance of punishing the decision to bear a child. T he 
remainder of this Article examines how the prosecutions violate Black 
women's right of privacy and the relationship between that privacy 
analysis and the goal of racial equality. 
VI . A CRITICAL AssESSMENT oF A RG U MENT S 
AGAINST INTERVENTION 
There is now a substantial body of scholarship challenging state 
intervention in pregnant women's conduct. 193 Yet much of the liter-
ature has not sufficiently taken into account the experience of poor 
Black women, the very women who are most affected. In addition, 
the literature has failed to address adequately the arguments on behalf 
of fetal protection. In this Part, I will critique various reproductive 
rights theories that have been used to challenge the control of pregnant 
women and show why they are not helpful in addressing the prose-
cution of drug-addicted mothers. In Part VII , I will present a privacy 
argument that more effectively confronts the government's policy. 
T hat analysis better explains the constitutional injury caused by the 
prosecutions because it recognizes race as a critical factor. 
190 S ce supra notes r 56- r 57 and accompanying text. 
19 1 Shei ton v. T ucker, 364 U.S . 479, 488 (r96o). 
192 S ee S! tpm notes 143-15 5 and accompanying text. 
l 9j Se e sources cite d supra noteS. 
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A. Bodily Autonomy and Integrity 
Much of the discourse challenging state intervention in the deci-
sions of pregnant women has occurred in the context of forced medical 
treatment. 194 Many commentators have argued that judicial decisions 
that allow doctors to perform surgery and other procedures on a 
pregnant woman without her consent violate women's right to bodily 
autonomy and integrity.195 It is difficult , however, to transfer the 
scholarship addressing compelled medical procedures to the issue of 
drug-addicted mothers. 
The interests of the drug-addicted mother appear to be weaker for 
three reasons . First, unlike forced medical treatment, punishing the 
pregnant drug addict does not require her to take affirmative steps to 
benefit the fetus. She is not asked to be a good samaritan; rather, 
she is punished for affirmatively doing harm to the fetus. Second, 
the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers involves no direct physical 
intrusion . Nor do prosecutions deprive women of control over their 
bodies by directly compelling them to undergo an unwanted biological 
process, as is the case with the prohibition of abortion. On this level, 
punishing drug-addicted mothers does not seem to implicate a mother's 
right to bodily integrity at all. 
Third , the mother's drug use has potentially devastating effects on 
the fetus and lacks any social justification . Indeed , forcing a woman 
to refrain from using harmful drugs through incarceration or court 
order m ay be seen as a benefit to the women herself, whereas forc ed 
medical procedures often aid the fetus only at the expense of the 
mother 's health or her deeply held religious beliefs. It is therefore 
harder to identify how the government's action infringes a constitu-
tionally protected interest. Consequently, some commentators who 
oppose the regulation of some potentially harmful conduct during 
pregnancy at the same time justify punishment of pregnant drug 
users. 196 vVe must therefore draw on another principle of autonomy 
to describe the infringement caused by these prosecutions: the right 
to make decisions about reproduction (here, the choice of carrying a 
pregnancy to term). 
In addition, many of the issues raised by forced medical treatment 
seem disconnected from the experiences of poor women of color. 19 7 
194 See, e .g., Ga llagher, supra note 8, at 46- 58; Nelson, Buggy & \Veil, Forced l'vf edical 
Treatment of Pregnant Wom en: "Compelling Each to Live as Seem s Goo d to th e R est" , 37 
H ASTI NGS L. ]. 703 (1986) ; R hode n, The J udge in t.he Delivery R oom: The Emergence of Court-
Ordered Ces areans, 74 CALIF . L. REv . 1951 (1986). 
195 S ee , e .g., Goldberg , su pra note 8, a t 6r 8- 23 ; Nel son , Buggy & Wei! , supra note 194 , a t 
750- 57; Rh ode n , supra note 194, at 196 7- 75 , 1995-99. 
l 96 S ee , e .g. , Stearns, lv! at.emal Duties During Pregnancy: Tow ard a Co nceptu al Fra·m.ework , 
21 N Ew ENG . L. REv. 595 , 62 9- 33 (198s -86); N ote, lV! atemal Righ ts and Fetal Wron gs : The 
Case Against th e Crim inal ization of "Fetal A buse," 10 1 H ARV. L. R EV . 994, 100 7 (1988). 
197 Th is is not to say th a t forced med ica l treatment has no releYance to the li ves of poor 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
For example, much of the literature focuses on ethical issues arising 
from treating the fetus as a patient and its impact on the relationship 
between the pregnant woman and her physician. 198 This debate is 
largely irrelevant to poor Black women, the majority of whom receive 
inadequate prenatal care. 199 Their major concern is not having an 
ethical conflict with their doctor, but affording or finding a doctor in 
the first place . The issue of whether intricate fetal surgery may be 
performed against a mother's will is far removed from the urgent 
needs of poor women who may not have available to them the most 
rudimentary means to ensure the health of the fetus. 200 
Forced treatment decisions equate women with inert vessels, dis-
regard their own choices, and value them solely for their capacity to 
nurture the fetus. 20 1 Although this view of women is reflected as well 
in the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers, it does not grasp the full 
indignity of the state's treatment of poor Black women. Government 
control of pregnancy perpetuates stereotypes that value women solely 
for their procreative capacity. But the prosecutions of crack addicts 
deny poor Black women even this modicum of value. By punishing 
them for having babies, they are deemed not even worthy of the 
dignity of childbearing. Thus, the prosecutions debase Black women 
women of color. In fact, court-o rdered medical procedures are performed disproportionately on 
pregnant minority women. A study of IS court-ordered cesarians published in I987 fo und that 
So% involved women of color; 27% of the wo men were not nat ive English speakers . See Koldcr, 
Gallagher & Parsons, CouYt-Orde1·ed ObstetYical Interventions, 3 I6 NEw ENG. ]. MED. I I 92, 
r 193 (1987); see also Daniels, CouYt-Ordercd Cesareans: A Crowing Concern for I ndigent Women, 
2 T CLEARING HOUSE REv. I064, 1065 (I988) (comparing the ge neral distribution of cesarian 
sections with that of cesarians performed pursuant to court order); Gallagher, Fetus as Patient, 
in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S, supra note 125, at 157, I83-84 (discussing the dis-
criminatory impact of forced medical treatment). 
198 See, e.g., Fletcher, Th e Fetus as Patient : Ethical I ssues , 246 ]. A.M.A. 772 (1981); 
Comment, Th e Fetal Patient and the Unwill ing !VI other: A Standard for Judi cial I ntervention, 
14 PAC. L.]. ro6s, ro65-79 (r983). 
199 See supra notes 147 & 148 . 
zoo T he punishment of drug-addicted mothers ra ises ethical issues affecting poor women of 
color, howe ve r, because drug-addicted mothers are often reported to gove rnment a uthorities by 
their own physicians. In the J ohnson trial , for example, J ohnso n's obstetricians provided the 
most damaging evidence against her by testifying that Johnso n had admitted to them that she 
had smoked crack soon before both of her children were de li ve red. See Trial Transcript, supra 
note 4, at r 5, 70. Punishing pregnan t women based on information from their doctors under-
mines the confidential doctor-patient relationship and deters women from sharing important 
information with health care providers or even from obtaining prenatal care . See Berrien, supra 
note I56, at 247; Moss, supya note 49, at I4I I-1z; Roberts, supra note 2, at 6o-6r. 
20 1 See, e.g. , Annas, Predicting the Future of PYivacy in Pregnancy: How Medical Technol-
ogy Affects the Legal Rights of P1·egnant Women, I3 NOVA L. REv. 329, 345 (1989) ("Treating 
the fetus agai nst the will of the mother requires us to degrade and deh uma nize the mother a nd 
treat her as an inert container."); Gallagher, supra note 8, at 2 7 ("The indi vidual wome n 
themselves become invisi bl e or viewed only as vesse ls - carriers of an infinite ly more valuable 
being."). 
l 
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even more than forced medical treatment's general devaluation of 
women. 202 
B. The Right to Make Medical and Lifestyle Decisions 
A second approach challenges restrictions on maternal conduct 
during pregnancy by advocating a woman's right to make medical 
and lifestyle decisions. zo3 Rather than focus on a woman's right to 
protect her body from physical intrusion, this approach focuses on a 
woman's right to engage in activities of her choice free from govern-
ment interference. This argument also loses its force in the context 
of maternal drug addiction. While the danger of government restric-
tions on a pregnant woman's normal conduct may be apparent, drug 
use during pregnancy arguably belongs in a separate category. The 
pregnant drug addict is not asked to refrain from generally acceptable 
behavior, such as sexual intercourse, work, or exercise. Rather, so-
ciety demands only that she cease conduct that it already deems illegal 
and reprehensible. 
Arguments based on a woman's right to make decisions about her 
pregnancy and her fetus also appear weak in the context of maternal 
drug addiction. Unlike healthy mothers, 204 pregnant drug addicts are 
not better able to make lifestyle and medical decisions that affect the 
fetus than the state or physicians. Nor can we say that a decision to 
carry a fetus to term automatically demonstrates that a drug-addicted 
mother cares deeply for it and is in a better position to monitor her 
own conduct during pregnancy than the state. Most would agree that 
the pregnant drug addict has exercised poor judgment in caring for 
herself and her fetus. The state should not substitute its judgment 
for that of the "normal" mother, but intervention in the case of the 
drug addict seems more justified. 
Although the government is arguably better able to make decisions 
about the care of the fetus than the drug-addicted mother, it is quite 
a different matter to allow the government to determine who is entitled 
to be a mother. State interference in the decision to bear a child is 
202 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
202 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 8, at 6or-o4; King, Should J'v!om Be Constrained in the 
Best Interests of the Fetus?, :3 NOVA L. REv. 393, 39i (1989); Note, supra note 8, at 613; 
Note, supra note 196, at 998-rooz. 
204 See, e.g., Note, supra note 8, at 6 I 3 ("[B]ecause the decisions a woman makes throughout 
her pregnancy depend on her individual values and preferences, complicated sets of life circum-
stances, and uncertain probabilities of daily risk, the woman herself is best situated to make 
these complex evaluations."); Note, Rethinking (iv!)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Reg-
ulation of Pregnancy, 103 H ARV. L. REV. 1325, 1339-41 (1990) (arguing that "the pregnant 
woman's physical and psychological position with respect to the fetus makes her a uniquely 
appropriate decisionmaker"). 
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constitutionally more significant than state control of lifestyle deci-
sions. 
The interference-in-women's-lifestyles approach also neglects the 
concerns of poor women of color. A common criticism of the prose-
cution of drug-addicted mothers is that the imposition of maternal 
duties will lead to punishment for less egregious conduct. Commen-
tators have predicted government penalties for cigarette smoking, con-
sumption of alcohol, strenuous physical activity, and failure to follow 
a doctor's orders. 205 Although valid , this argument ignores the reality 
of poor Black women whom are currently being arrested. T he ref-
erence to a parade of future horribles to criticize the fetal rights 
doctrine belittles the significance of current government action. It 
seems to imply that the prosecution of Black crack addicts is not 
enough to generate concern and that we must postulate the prosecution 
of white middle-class women in order for the challenge to be mean-
ingful. 206 
C. The Focus on Abortion 
Another aspect of the reproductive rights literature that limits our 
understanding of reproductive choice is its focus on abortion rights. 
One problem is that this focus provides an inadequate response to a 
central argument in support of the regulation of pregnancy. John 
Robertson, for example, has contended that if a woman forgoes her 
right to an abortion, she forfeits her right to autonomy and choice. 20 7 
If abortion is the heart of women's reproductive rights , then state 
policies that do not interfere with that right are acceptable. 208 Simi-
larly, if the full extent of reproductive freedom is the right to have an 
abortion, then a policy that encourages abortion 209 - such as the 
205 See, e.g., l\-1oss, supra note 2, at z88-89; Note, supya note 8, at 6o6-o;. 
206 I recognize, however, th e tactical benefit of demonstrat ing that the prosecution of pregnant 
crack addicts should be the concern of all women. It may be more effective poli tically to 
convince affluent women that such government polic ies also jeopardize their lifestyles. 
207 See Robertson , supra note 13, at 43 7- 38, 445 - 41 ("[The woman] waived her right to 
resis t bodily intrusions made for the sake of the fetu s when she chose to continue the preg-
nancy."); Robertson , The Right to Procuate and I n Utero Fetal Th erapy , 3 ]. LEGAL MED. 
333, 359 (rg82); see also Shaw, Conditional Prospective R ights of the Fetus , 5 ]. L EGAL MED. 
63, 88 (1984) (arguing that the mother's duty to pro tec t the fetus from harm increases after 
viability "because she has forgone her right to choose abo rtion"). 
zos See, e.g., Mathieu, R espec ting Liberty and Preve ntin g Harm: Limits of State Int ervent ion 
in Prenatal Choic e , 8 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL 'Y r g , 32 - 37 (rg8sl (arguing that the right to a n 
abortion is not inconsistent with th e duty to prevent or not cause ha rm to the fetu s); Walker & 
Puzder, State Pro tection of the Unborn After Roe \". Wade: .-1 Leg islatic•e Proposal , 13 STETSON 
L. REv. 23 7, 24 1 , 253 ( r 984) (arguing that extend ing the fou rtee nth a mendment 's protection to 
unborn chi ldren wou ld not impair women's right to abo rtion). 
209 The prosecution of drug-addicted mothers can be see n as encouraging abortion because 
pregnant drug-addi cts may feel pressure to abort the fet us ra th er than risk being cha rged w ith 
a crim e. 
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prosecution of crack-addicted mothers - does not interfere with that 
freedom. 210 
As in the previous approaches, the emphasis on abortion fails to 
incorporate the needs of poor women of color. The primary concern 
of white, middle-class women are laws that restrict choices otherwise 
available to them, such as statutes that make it more difficult to 
obtain an abortion. The main concern of poor women of color, how-
ever, are the material conditions of poverty and oppression that restrict 
their choices. 211 The reproductive freedom of poor women of color, 
for example, is limited significantly not only by the denial of access 
to safe abortions, but also by the lack of resources necessary for a 
healthy pregnancy and parenting relationship. 212 Their choices are 
limited not only by direct government interference with their decisions, 
but also by government's failure to facilitate them. The focus of 
reproductive rights discourse on abortion neglects this broader range 
of reproductive health issues that affect poor women of color. 213 Ad-
no See Stearns, supra note 196, at 604 ("It is inconsistent to argue that a [pre-natal duty] 
rule unconstitutionally removes the right to abort if in fact the rule actually encourages women 
to exercise that very right."). 
21 J If the facilities necessary to effectuate a reproductive decision cost money, poor women 
may not be able to afford to take advantage of them. Prenatal care, abortion services, artificial 
insemination, fetal surgery, contraceptives, and family planning counseling are some examples 
of the means to realize a reproductive choice that may be financially inaccessible to low-income 
women. See generally Gertner, Interference with RepYOductive Choice, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS 
FOR THE Iggos, supra note 125, at 307, 307-I2 (discussing economic and legal obstacles to 
reproductive choice); Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 125, at 20-23, so-SI (discussing limitations on 
access to abortion services and new reproductive technology). 
In Roberts, The Future of Reproductive Choice for Poor Women and Women of Color, I2 
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 59 (Iggo), I describe the constraints on the reproductive choices available 
to a hypothetical pregnant young woman in the inner city. See id. at 62-64. 
212 See supra note I44· 
2l.l An example of how the unilateral focus on abortion has neglected - and even contra-
dicted - the interests of poor women of color is the pro-choice opposition to sterilization reform 
in the I970s. In I977, the Committee to End Sterilization Abuse introduced in the New York 
City Council guidelines to prevent sterilization abuse, an important issue for women of color. 
See supra notes I24-130. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare also considered 
the guidelines in I979· The guidelines had two key provisions: they required informed consent 
in the preferred language of the patient and a 30-day waiting period between the signing of the 
consent form and the sterilization procedure. Representatives of the National Abortion Rights 
Action League and Planned Parenthood testified against the New York and national guidelines 
as restrictions on women's access to sterilization. See Tax, Tax Replies, NATION, July 24/3I, 
Ig8g, at I ro, 148 (rg8g) (letter to the editor); see also Petchesky, supra note 124, at 35-39 
(discussing arguments asserted by opponents of the federal sterilization regulations). 
The abortion rights of women of color have also been overlooked. One example is the 
belated political mobilization on the part of the pro-choice movement triggered by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., rog S. Ct. 3040 (I g8g). There was 
no similar response to the Court's decisions in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Harris 
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (rgSo), which allowed the government to deny poor women public 
funding for abortions. The pro-choice movement was relatively complacent about the Court's 
effective denial of access to abortions for poor women until the rcproducti\·e rights of affluent 
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dressing the concerns of women of color will expand our VISIOn of 
reproductive freedom to include the full scope of what it means to 
have control over one's reproductive life. 214 
VII. CLAIMING THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY FOR WOMEN OF COLOR 
A. Identifying the Constitutional Issue 
In deciding which of the competing interests involved in the pros-
ecution of drug-addicted mothers prevails - the state's interest in 
protecting the health of the fetus or the woman's interest in preventing 
state intervention - it is essential as a matter of constitutional law 
to identify the precise nature of the woman's right at stake. In the 
Johnson case, the prosecutor framed the constitutional issue as follows: 
"What constitutionally protected freedom did Jennifer engage in when 
she smoked cocaine ?"21 5 T hat was the wrong question. Johnson was 
not convicted of using drugs. Her "constitutional right" to smoke 
cocaine was never at issue. Johnson was prosecuted because she chose 
to carry her pregnancy to term while she was addicted to crack. Had 
she smoked cocaine during her pregnancy and then had an abortion, 
she would not have been charged with such a serious crime . The 
proper question, then, is "What constitutionally protected freedom did 
Jennifer engage in when she decided to have a baby, even though she 
was a drug addict?" 
Understanding the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers as pun-
ishment for having babies clarifies the constitutional right at stake. 
The woman's right at issue is not the right to abuse drugs or to cause 
the fetus to be born with defects. 21 6 It is the right to choose to be a 
women were also threatened. See Stearns, Roe v. \Vade: Our Struggle Continues , 4 BERKELEY 
WOMEN'S L.J. I, i (1989). 
214 The struggle for abor ti on rights nevertheless contin ues to play a critical role in advancin g 
women 's reproductive a utonomy. Expanding the scope of reproductive rights beyond abortion 
to include the right to bear healthy children may also help pro-choice advocates in the abo rtion 
debate. One of the tactics of the right-to-li fe movement is to characterize the pro-choice 
movemen t as people who do not care about children. I participated in a panel discussion in 
which the right-to-life participants brought along a contingent of supporters - all with yo un g 
children on their laps. A more complete view of reproductive choice may help to dispel this 
image . See Colker, R eply to Sarah Bums, 1.3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.]. 207, 212 11.31 (1 990l. I do 
not, however, advocate transforming reproductive freedom from a women's rights issue into a 
children's rights issue. See Burns, Notes from the Field: A R eply to Professor Calker , 1.3 HARV. 
WOMEN'S L.J. 189 , 205-06 (1990). 
215 Trial Transcript, supm note 4 at .364 
216 Su preme Court pri vacy analysis has similarly misc haracterized the fundamental right at 
issue in other contexts. The Court has typically iden tified the constitutiona l question as whethe r 
there is a fundamental right to engage in the conduct forbidd en by the Jaw at issue (fo r example , 
abortion , adultery, contraception, or homosexual acti\·ity). See, e.g . , lVlichael H. v. Gerald D., 
109 S. Ct. 2.3.33, 2.343 (1989) (identifying the right at issue as "specifically the power of the 
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mother that is burdened by the criminalization of conduct during 
pregnancy. 217 This view of the constitutional issue reveals the rele-
vance of race to the resolution of the competing interests. Race has 
historically determined the value society places on an individual's right 
to choose motherhood. Because of the devaluation of Black mother-
hood, protecting the right of Black women to choose to bear a child 
has unique significance. In the following section, I argue that the 
prosecutions of addicted mothers violate traditional liberal notions of 
privacy. I also demonstrate how the issue of race informs the tradi-
tional analysis and calls for a reassessment of the use of privacy 
doctrine in the struggle to eliminate gender and racial subordination. 
B. OveYview of PYivacy A yguments 
Prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers infringe on two aspects of 
the right to individual choice in reproductive decisionmaking. F irst, 
they infringe on the freedom to continue a pregnancy that is essential 
to an individual's personhood and autonomy. This freedom implies 
that state control of the decision to carry a pregnancy to term can be 
as pernicious as state control of the decision to terminate a pregnancy. 
Second, the prosecutions infringe on choice by imposing an invidious 
government standard for the entitlement to procreate. Such imposi-
tion of a government standard for childbearing is one way that society 
denies the humanity of those who are different. The first approach 
emphasizes a woman's right to autonomy over her reproductive life; 
the second highlights a woman's right to be valued equally as a human 
natural father to assert parental rights over a child born into a woman's existing marriage with 
another man"); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) ("The issue presented is whether 
the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy."). 
Jed Rubenfeld has observed that this approach obscures the real danger of laws that abridge 
the right of privacy - their use as a means for government to control critical aspects of our 
lives and identity. See Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 739 (rg8g). 
Rubenfeld writes that "[t]he fundament of the right to privacy is not to be found in the supposed 
fundamentality of what the law proscribes. It is to be found in what the law imposes." I d.; 
see also Tribe & Dorf, supm note r 6o, at 1065-71 (describing the enterprise of designating 
fundamental rights as a question of the proper level of abstraction at which to portray those 
rights). 
217 Ohio Senate Bill No. 324, which would create a new crime of "prenatal child neglect," 
forces drug-addicted mothers to choose between going to jail and giving up their right to bear 
children. See S.B. N o. 324, § 2919.22 r (B), II8th Ohio General Assembly, Regular Session 
1989-90. A repeat offender must elect either to undergo tubal ligation or to participate in a 
five-year contraception program. If she fails to remain drug-free during the five-year program, 
the judge must sentence her to be sterilized. See S.B. No. 324 § 2919. 22r (B)(2)(c). If she 
refuses to make the required election, she will be held guilty of "aggravated prenatal child 
neglect," a first degree felony carrying a possible 25-year prison sentence. S. B. No. 324, 
§§ 2919.221(E), 2929.11(B). 
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being. 218 In other words, the prosecution of crack-addicted mothers 
infringes upon both a mother 's right to make decisions that determine 
her individual identity and her right to be respected equally as a 
human being by recognizing the value of her motherhood. 
Inherent in the thesis of this Article is a tension between the 
reliance on the liberal rhetoric of choice and an acknowledgement of 
the fallacy of choice for poor women of color. This Article also seeks 
to incorporate liberal notions of individual autonomy while acknowl-
edging the coll.ective injury perpetrated by racism. 21 9 This tension 
may be an example of what Mari Matsuda calls "multiple conscious-
ness. "220 Professor M atsuda observes that "outsider" lawyers and 
scholars must often adopt a "dualist approach" that incorporates an 
elitist legal system and the concept of legal rights while seeing the 
world from the standpoint of the oppressed. "Unlike the post-modern 
critics of the left . . . outsiders, including feminists and people of 
color, have embraced legalism as a tool of necessity, making legal 
consciousness their own in order to attack injustice. "2 21 
This internal struggle between the embrace of legalism and the 
recognition of oppression characterizes a process of enlightenment. 222 
Working through the privacy analysis from the perspective of poor 
Black women uncovers unexplored benefits to be gained from liberal 
doctrine while revealing liberalism's inadequacies. This process of 
putting forth new propositions for challenge and subversion will pro-
duce a better understanding of the law and the ways in which it can 
be used to pursue social justice . 
C. The R ight to Choose Procreation 
Punishing drug-addicted mothers unconstitutionally burdens the 
right to choose to bear a child. Certain interests of the individual -
21 8 Both aspects of the constitu tiona l protection of the indi vidual's personhood satisfy Martin 
Luther King Jr. 's test for the legitimacy of man-made laws: "Any law that uplifts human 
personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust." M. L. KING, ]R., WHY 
WE CAN 'T WAIT 85 (r 963) (Letter from Birmingham J a il); accord West, Progressive and Con-
servative Constitutionalism, supra note 14, at 686- Si. 
219 Kimberle Crenshaw has argued that , although liberal legal ideology has served important 
functions in Blacks' struggle against racial domination , it is important to develop strategies that 
minimize the costs of engaging in legitimating libera l discourse . See C renshaw, supra note 14 , 
at 1384- 8i . She suggests that such strategies must have a community perspective: "History has 
shown that the most valuable political asset of the Black community has been its abili ty to 
assert a collective identity and to name its collective political reality. Liberal reform discourse 
must not be allowed to undermine the Black collective identity." I d . at r 336. 
22 0 Matsuda, When th e FiYst Quail Calls: Mult iple Consciousness as J w·ispmdential Method, 
I I WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 7, 8 (rgSg). 
221 ld . 
222 S ee Harris, supra note 14, at 584 (discussing the complex dialogue between the aspira-
tional voices of liberalism and the voices of real people). For a disc ussion of the importance of 
aspirational thinking, see Calker, supra note I JO, at JOI 8 -I g. 
l 
I 
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generally called "rig hts" - are entitled to heightened protection 
against government interference under the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. 223 The right of privacy is recognized as one 
cluster of such interests, implicit in the "liberty" that the fourteenth 
amendment protects. 224 The right of privacy has been interprete d to 
include the "interest in independence in making certain kinds of im-
portant decisions . " 22 5 This concept of decisional privacy226 seeks to 
protect intimate or personal affairs that are fundamental to an indi-
vidual's identity and moral personhood from unjustified government 
intrusion. 2 2 7 A t the forefront of the development of the right of 
privacy has been the freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage 
and family life . 22 8 Once an interest has been deemed part of the right 
of privacy, the government needs a compelling reason to intervene to 
survive constitutional scrutiny. 229 
Considerable support exists for the conclusion that the decision to 
procreate230 is part of the right of privacy. The decision to bear 
22.3 See cases cited infra note 228. 
22
4 See Roe v. Wade , 410 U.S. rr3, 152- 56 (1973). For a description of the history of 
privacy jurisprudence, see Rubenfeld , supra note 2 r 6, at 740-52. 
225 Whalen v. Roe, 42 9 U.S. 589 , 599-6oo (1977). 
226 For a discussion of the distinction betwee n decisional privacy and privacy in the sense 
of restricted access, see Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract 
Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 46r, 463- 66 (1987). See generally Note, Roe and Paris: Does 
Privacy Have a Princ iple ?, 26 STAN . L. REv. rr6r (197 4) (analyzing and defining the concept 
of privacy). 
227 See L. TRIBE , supra note r64, § IS-I , at 1302-04 ; Feinberg , Autonomy, Sovere ignty, and 
Privacy: Mom! Ideals in the Constitu tion?, s8 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 445, 446-67 (1983); 
Gerety, Redefin ing Privacy , 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 236 (1977) (defining privacy as 
"an autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal identity"); Henkin , Privacy and Auton-
omy, 74 CoLUM. L. REV. I4ro, 1412- 29 (1974). For the classic liberal defense of personal 
auton omy, see }. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 77-79 (G. Himmerfaub ed . 1974) (Ist ed. I859). 
22s S ee , e.g. , Roe v. Wade , 4IO U.S. II 3 (1973) (right to choose whether to terminate a 
pregnancy); Lov ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967) (right to choose one's spouse); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S . 479, 485 (I96S) (right to decide whether to use contraceptives); Skinner 
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S . 535 (1942 ) (ri ght to procreate) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925 ) (right to select the schooling of children under one's co ntrol ); Meyer v. Ne braska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923) (r ight to dete rmine the language taught to one's children). 
229 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at ISS · 
23 J Exploring the contours of the right to procreate is beyond the scope of this Article. I 
focu s on the aspect of the right of privacy that guarantees the choice to carry a pregnancy to 
term. I want to protect the individual from punishment for making a reproductive decision 
rather than to ful fi ll the individual's desire to have children. The value at th e heart of my 
argument is not procreation , but autonomy. See L. TRIB E, supra note 164, § 15-23 , at 1423 
("As the Court itself stressed in Carey, the constitutional pri nciple of 'indi vidual autonomy' 
affirmed in these cases protected not proc reation, but the individual 's 'right of decision' about 
procreation." (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 6i8 , 68i-89 (1977)) (emphasis 
in original)). 
Delineating the right to proc reate is difficult indeed. It involves defining the procreative 
activi ties encompassed by the right , as well as the limits on government interference with those 
activities . N ew developments in reproductive tec hnology have complicated the problem by 
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children is universally acknowledged in the privacy cases as being "at 
the very heart" of these constitutionally protected choices. 231 In Ei-
senstadt v. Baird, 232 for example, the Court struck down a Massa-
chusetts statute that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to 
unmarried persons. Although the case was decided on equal protec-
tion grounds, the Court recognized the vital nature of the freedom to 
choose whether to give birth to a child: "If the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child. "233 
The right of privacy protects equally the choice to bear children 
and the choice to refrain from bearing them. 234 The historical expe-
riences of Black women illustrate the evil of government control over 
procreative decisions. Their experiences demonstrate that the dual 
allowing people to procreate in ways current law does not contemplate. See, e.g., Andrews, 
Alternative Modes of Reproduction , in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990s, supra note rzs, 
at 259; Developments in the Law - Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REv. 
1519, 1525-56 (199o); Special Project: Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Preg-
nancy, and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 602-52 (1986). For discussions of the right to 
procreate, see Binion, Reproductive Freedom and the Constitution: The Limits on Choice, 4 
BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 12, 24-39 (1989); Robertson, supra note 13, at 405-20; and Scott, 
Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 
DUKE L.J. 8o6, 827-33. 
231 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977). Although dicta in many of 
the privacy decisions include the decision to bear a child among those protected by the right of 
privacy, the holdings of the cases concern the freedom not to procreate - the right to avoid 
unwanted pregnancy tLrough contraception or abortion. See Carey, 43 r U.S. at 694 (holding 
that a state law limiting minors' access to contraceptives violated fourteenth amendment); Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. I13, I53 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (r<J72) (striking down 
a state law limiting unmarried people's access to contraceptives), Griswold v. Connecticut, 38 I 
U.S. 479, 485 (I965). By contrast, the Supreme Court has hardly addressed the right to bear 
a child. Its only decision upholding the right to procreate is Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535 (1942). See infra pp. I475-76. 
232 405 U.S. 438 (I972). 
233 I d. at 453 (emphasis omitted). 
234 Support for the right to procreate can be found in the language of Roe v. \Vade, in which 
the Court held that the constitutional "right of privacy is broad enough to encompass a 
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis 
added). The Court made the woman's choice - either to terminate her pregnancy or complete 
it - the crux of the privacy right it recognized. Because it is the woman's choice that is 
guaranteed, the alternative to the abortion decision - the decision to carry the fetus to term 
- must also be protected. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747, 778 n.6 (Ig86) (Stevens, ]., concurring); L. TRIBE, supra note r64, § IS-
IO, at IJ40 (arguing that the meaning of the privacy cases is that "whether one person's body 
shall be the source of another life must be left to that person and that person alone to decide") 
(emphasis omitted); cf. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn 
from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. I, 14 ( r g8g) (noting the difficulty in justifying any 
constitutional distinction between "the state's power to require an abortion in certain circum-
stances and the state's power to forbid one" (emphasis in original)). 
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nature of the decisional right recognized in the privacy cases goes 
beyond the logical implications of making a choice. The exploitation 
of Black women's foremothers during slavery to breed more slaves 
and the sterilization abuse that they have suffered reveal society's 
pervasive devaluation of Black women as mothers. 
Burdening both the right to terminate a pregnancy and the right 
to give birth to a child violates a woman's personhood by denying her 
autonomy over the self-defining decision of whether she will bring 
another being into the world. Furthermore, criminalizing the choice 
to give birth imposes tangible burdens on women, as well as the 
intangible infringement on personhood. Punishing women for having 
babies is in this sense at least as pernicious as forced maternity at the 
behest of the state. 235 
If a woman's decision to bear a child is entitled to constitutional 
protection, it follows that the government may not unduly burden 
that choice. In Cleveland BoaYd of Education v. LaFleuY, 236 the Court 
invalidated mandatory maternity leave policies that had the effect of 
burdening the choice to procreate. The Court viewed the school 
board's policy of forced maternity leave as a form of penalty imposed 
on pregnant teachers for asserting their right to decide to have chil-
dren. 23 7 Although the Court applied a rational basis test to the ma-
ternity leave policies in LaP leuY, 238 the more drastic burden of crim-
inal punishment should warrant strict scrutiny. 239 Even under the 
l35 But see Rubenfeld, mpra note 2 r6, at 796-97 (arguin g that iaws limiting family size and 
laws prohibiting abortion are "enormously different in their real, material effect on individuals' 
Jives" and cautioning against being "misled by their formal similarities") . Ruben fe ld finds that, 
al thou gh both laws impinge o n the child-bearing decision , a law th at in effect requires women 
to bear children takes over women's lives far more than a law that forb ids them from having 
more than a prescribed number of children. Se e id. at 797 ; see also R. PETCHESKY, ABORTION 
AND WOMA:-<'s CHOICE 387- 90 (r984) (criticizing the a ssumption of "a mistaken symmetry 
between 'the right to have children ' a nd 'the right ... not to have them"'). Petchesky postulates 
that in a society whe re gender, class, and racial eq uality have been ach ieved, the state might 
be justified in denying individuals a right to procreate. Unlike Pctchesky, I have endeavored 
to analyze the pol itical implications of the punishment of drug-addicted mothers only in the 
context of the current and historical conditions of ge nder, class, and racial inequality. Petchesky 
presents just such a n analysis of abortion. See id. a t 12-13. Rubenfeld also m ay have reached 
a different conclusion if he had considered the real, materia l effects on women of color created 
by the state's interfe rence in the decisio n to procrea te. Of course, the consequen ces of compelling 
childbirth and of prohibitin g it are not identical, and the government 's asserted justifications 
for intervention are not always of equa l weight. 
236 414 U. S. 632 (1974). 
237 S ee McN ulty, Si!pra note 8 , at 315; Note, supra note 8 , at 618. 
!.lS LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 639-48. 
239 U nder Roe v. Wade , law·s allowing the prosec ution of drug-addicted mothers would have 
to m eet a strict scrutiny test. As the Court stated in Roe, "(W]here certain 'fundamental rights' 
are in-;olved, the Court has held th at regulat ion limiting these righ ts may be justified only by 
a 'com pelling state interest,' and that legislati\·e enactmen ts must be narrowly drawn to express 
on ly the le gitimate state interests at sta ke." 410 U.S . at r 13 (c itations omitted). I ha,:e a lready 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
Court's current analysis, which distinguishes between direct and in-
direct governmental interference in reproductive decisionmaking, 240 
government intrusion as extreme as criminal prosecution would unduly 
infringe on protected autonomy. 241 The Court has expressly distin-
guished , for example , the government's refusal to subsidize the exer-
cise of the abortion right from the infliction of criminal penalties on 
the exercise of that right. 242 Criminal prosecutions of drug-addicted 
mothers do more than discourage a choice; they exact a severe penalty 
on the drug user for choosing to complete her pregnancy. 
These privacy concepts have two benefits for advocating the re-
productive rights of women of color in particular: the right of privacy 
stresses the value of personhood, and it protects against the totalitarian 
abuse of government power. First, affirming Black women's consti-
tutional claim to personhood is particularly important because these 
women historically have been denied the dignity of their full humanity 
and identity. 243 The principle of self-definition has special significance 
demonstrated that laws punishing drug-addicted mothers do not meet this test. See supra notes 
190-192 and accompanying text. 
240 In upholding the denial of public funding for abortions, the Court distinguished between 
a direct governmental burden on the exercise of reprodu ctive choice and the government's 
refusal to subsidize one choice, abortion, while subsidizing the alternative, childbirth. See 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 305 r- 53 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 
U.S. 297, 314-18 (r98o); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 - 77 (1977). See generally Appleton, 
Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the Abortion-Funding Cases 
to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Th es is, 8r CoLUM. L. REv. 72 r , 
724-45 (1981) (arguing that after i'vfaher, state action will only face strict sc rutiny if it is an 
"impingement" on a fundamental right). 
24! The Court has struck down state regulations of abortion that so restricted women's access 
to abortion that they effectively denied women a choice. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American 
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 4 76 U.S. 74 7, 7 59-71 ( 1986) (striking down informed 
conse nt , reporting, and standard-of-care requirements for post-viability abortions); City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 431- 52 (r983) (striking down 
provisions of ordinance requiring parental consent, informed consent, 24-hour waiting period, 
performance of all second-trimester abortions in a hospital, and ''humane and sanitary" disposal 
of fetal remains); Colautti v. Franklin , 439 U.S. 379, 389- 401 (1979) (striking down viability-
determination and standard-of-care requirements as vague); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth , 
428 U.S. 52 , 69-75 (1976) (stri king down, inter alia, spousal and parental consent requirements). 
242 See Colautti , 439 U.S. at 386 n .7 (describing criminal penalties as a "direct obstacle" to 
rep roductive choice to be distinguished from denial of funding); I'daher, 432 U.S. at 474 n. 8. 
243 Patricia Williams has explored the differing perspectives on "rights" held by Blacks and 
whites - in this case the predominantly white critical legal studies movement. She explains 
that, for Blacks, the stereotyping of human experience created by righ ts discourse (the focus of 
the critical legal studies critique) is a lesser historical evil than having been ignored altogether. 
See Williams, A !chemical Notes: Reconstmcting I deals from Deconstructed Rights, 2 2 HARV. 
C.R. -C.L. L. REv. 401 , 414 (1987) ("The black experience of a nonymity, the estrangement of 
being without a name, has been one of li ving in the obliv ion of soc iety's inverse , beyond the 
dimension of any consideration at a ll. Thus , the experience of rights-assert ion has been a 
process of finding th e self. ") Sim il a rly, Kimberle Crenshaw observes that dispossessed people 
use rights rhetoric "to redeem some of the rhetorical promises" of popu lar political discourse by 
fo rcing society to live up to its deepest commitments. See Crenshaw, supra note 14, at 1366. 
l 
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for Black women. Angela Harris recognizes in the writings of Zora 
Neale Hurston an insistence on a "conception of identity as a construc-
tion, not an essence . . . . [B]lack women have had to learn to 
construct themselves in a society that denied them full selves. "244 
Black women's willful self-definition is an adaptation to a history of 
social denigration. Rejected from the dominant society's norm of 
womanhood , Black women have been forced to resort to their own 
internal resources. Harris contrasts this process of affirmative self-
definition with the feminist paradigm of women as passive victims. 
Black women willfully create their own identities out of "fragments 
of experience, not discovered in one's body or unveiled after male 
domination is eliminated. "245 
The concept of personhood embodied in the right of privacy can 
be used to affirm the role of will and creativity in Black women's 
construction of their own identities . Relying on the concept of self-
definition celebrates the legacy of Black women who have survived 
and transcended conditions of oppression. 246 T he process of defining 
one's self and declaring one's personhood defies the denial of self-
ownership inherent in slavery. 247 T hus , the right of privacy, with its 
affirmation of personhood, is especially suited for challenging the 
devaluation of Black motherhood underlying the prosecutions of drug-
addicted women. 
Another important element of the right of privacy is its delineation 
of the limits of governmental power. 248 T he protection from govern-
ment abuse also makes the right of privacy a useful legal tool for 
protecting the reproductive rights of women of color. 249 Poor women 
244 H arr is, supra note 14, a t 6r3 (c iting Hurs ton , How It Feels to Be Colored Me, in I LOVE 
MYSE LF WHEN I AM LAUGHING AND THEN AGAIN WHEN I AM LOOKING MEAN AND 
IMPRESSIVE 152, 155 (A. W alker ed. 1979)). 
245 !d. 
246 For examples of Black wome n who have t ra nsce nded conditions of op pression. see L. 
HUTC HINSON, ANNA ]. COOPER: A VOICE FROM THE SOUTH (198 1); and ]. ROBINSO N, THE 
MONTGOMERY Bus BOYCOTT AND THE WOM EN WHO STARTED IT: THE MEMOIR OF ] 0 ANN 
GIBSON ROBI NSON (1 987). The fictional writings of Black women also exp ress this tradition. 
See, e.g ., T. MORRISON, BELOVED (1987); A. WALKER, THE COLOR PURPLE (1982) . 
24 7 See A llen, supra note 103, a t 141. 
248 Rubenfeld, fo r example, proposes an interpretation of the right of p rivacy that focu ses 
on the affirmative conseq uences of laws challenged on the basis of p rivacy claims. See Rub-
enfeld, supra note 216, at 782- 84 . It is the "totalitarian" in tervention of gove rnment into a 
pe rson's life that the right of privacy protects against. Id. at 787 . The right of privacy, then, 
means "the right not to have the course of one's life dictated by the state." I d. at 807. 
24 9 Protection fro m government powe r need not be the full exten t of the Constitution's 
guarantee of autonomy a nd personhood. See infra pp. I4 78- 80. Recogni zing th at "[a ]s long as 
a state exists and enforces any laws at all, it makes political choices, " Fra nces Olsen a rgues 
th at the dis t inction between state intervention a nd nonintervention is a myth . O lsen, The Myth 
of State ! nteYwntion in the Family, r8 U. M ICH. J.L. REF. 835, 836 (1985). Olsen furth er 
argues that the poor have the least to gai n from the rhetoric of noninterve ntion: "The a ttempt 
to criticize state ' inte rve ntion ' instead oi cr iti cizi ng th e part icular policies pu rsued may be 
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of color are especially vulnerable to government control over their 
decisions. 250 The government's pervasive involvement in Black wom-
en's lives illustrates the inadequacy of the privacy critique presented 
by some white feminist scholars. 25 1 Catharine MacKinnon, for ex-
ample, argues that privacy doctrine is based on the false liberal as-
sumption that government nonintervention into the private sphere 
promotes women's autonomy. 252 The individual woman's legal right 
of privacy, according to MacKinnon, functions instead as "a means 
of subordinating women's collective needs to the imperatives of male 
supremacy. "253 
This rejection of privacy doctrine does not take into account the 
contradictory meaning of the private sphere for women of color. Fem-
inist legal theory focuses on the private realm of the family as an 
institution of violence and subordination. 254 Women of color, how-
especially limiting for poor people, who often have to rely on various government programs and 
are thus less likely to benefit from any political strategy based on the myth of nonintervention." 
ld. at 863. 
250 See supra pp. 1432-34 . 
25 1 Some feminist scholars have argued that a gender equality approach to reproductive 
freedom advances women 's rights better than a privacy rationale. See, e .g., Copelan, Unpacking 
Patriarchy: Reprodu ction, Sexuality, Originalism, and Constitutional Change, in A LESS THAN 
PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 303, 322-26 (J. 
Lobel ed. 1988); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution , 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 , 1016-28 
(1984); MacKinnon , Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology, in ABORTIOi'l: MORAL AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 45 (J. Garfield & P. Hennessey eds. 1984). 
For a dialogue concerning the usc of equality doctrine versus privacy doctrin e to advocate 
abortion rights, see Calker, Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron? - A Study of the Briefs Filed 
in William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. WoMEN's L.]. 137 (1990); 
Burns, Notes from the Field: A Reply t.o Professor Calker, 13 HARV. WoMEN's L.J. 189 (1990); 
and Colker, Reply to Sarah Burns, 13 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 207 (1990). In her response to 
Ruth Calker's criticism of the emphasis on privacy doctrine in feminist litigation, Sarah Burns 
raises several important questions: 
Why should we not insist that the question whe ther to have an abortion is a woman's 
private moral decision outside the public realm and beyond public interference? Why is 
arguing for equality necessarily more ' radical' and less 'liberally co-opted' than arguing 
for fundamental liberty and autonomy for women? Are not equality concepts co-opted 
by liberal interpretation? Can equality work as a concept with out the concepts of liberty 
and autonomy? 
Burns, supra , at 193. I attempt to answer some of these questions in this Article , especially as 
they relate to women of colo<. For a defe nse of privacy that responds to the feminist cri tique, 
see A. ALLEN, :;upra note r6o, at 57 (arguing that the "solution to the privacy problem women 
fac e begins with promoting greater em phasis on opportunities for individual form s of privacy, 
rather than in rej ecting privacy"); and Olsen, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term - Comment: 
Unrav eling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. ros , 1 ! 7 (I989) (arguing the importance of ex-
tending privacy doctrine equal ly to women and men, "even as we pursue efforts to dismantle 
the fa.l se dichotomies underlying it"). 
252 See MacKinnon, supra note 25 1, at SI-53-
253 !d. at 49-
254 "[T]he legal concept of pri vacy can and has shielded the place of battery, marital rape, 
and wome n's exploited la bor ; has preserved the central institutions whereby women are depYi<-•ed 
of identity, a utonomy. con trol and self-definition; a nd has protected the primary activity through 
whi ch male supremacy is ex wessed and enforced." !J. at 53 (e mph as is in origin al). 
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ever, often experience the family as the site of solace and resistance 
against racial oppression. ZS5 For many women of color, the immediate 
concern in the area of reproductive rights is not abuse in the pr,ivate 
sphere, but abuse of government power. The prosecution of crack-
addicted mothers and coerced sterilization are examples of state inter-
vention that pose a much greater threat for women of color than for 
white women. 
Another telling example is the issue of child custody. The primary 
concern for white middle-class women with regard to child custody is 
private custody battles with their husbands following the termination 
of a marriage. 256 But for women of color, the dominant threat is 
termination of parental rights by the state. 257 Again, the imminent 
danger faced by poor women of color comes from the public sphere, 
not the private. Thus, the protection from government interference 
that privacy doctrine affords may have a different significance for 
women of color. 
D. Unconstitutional Government StandaYds joy Procreation: 
The Inters ection of PYivacy and Equality 
The equal protection clause and the right of privacy provide the 
basis for two separate constitutional challenges to the prosecution of 
drug-addicted mothers. The singling out of Black mothers for pun-
ishment combines in a single government action several wrongs pro-
hibited by both constitutional doctrines. Black mothers are denied 
autonomy over procreative decisions because of their race. The gov-
ernment's denial of Black women's fundamental right to choose to 
bear children serves to perpetuate the legacy of racial discrimination 
embodied in the devaluation of Black motherhood. T he full scope of 
the government's violation can better be understood, then, by a con-
stitutional theory that acknowledges the complementary and overlap-
ping qualities of the Constitution's guarantees of equality and pri-
vacy. 258 Viewing the prosecutions as imposing a racist government 
standard for procreation uses this approach. 259 
255 See Jones, supra note 108, at 237; Kline , supra note I7, at 122 - 23. Patric ia Cain observes 
that lesbia ns ' experiences of the private sphere may also differ from l'/1acKinnon's description: 
"lesbians who live our private lives removed from the intimate p-rese nce of men do indeed 
experience time free from male domination. W hen we leave the male-dominated pubiic sphc:re, 
we co me home to a woman-ident ified private sphere." Cain , supra note 21, at 2 r 2. 
256 See Kline, supra note 17. at I2 g. 
25i See id . at r28-3r (criticizing a feminist analysis of child custody law that neglects the 
experiences of Black and Native American women ); supra notes rog-r r 5 an d accompanying 
text. 
158 See L. TRIBE , suPra note 164, § 16-g, at q.)8-6o (discussing the intersection of "preferred 
rights" and "equality of rights") . 
259 The issue of the constitutionality of a gover!1ment standard for procreation ;·aises the 
q uestion of whether the right to proc reate is limited and therefore implies certaiP. requirements 
for entitlement. Eliz2.beth Scott . for example, defines the right to proueatc as "the right to 
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Poor crack addicts are punished for having babies because they 
fail to measure up to the state's ideal of motherhood. Prosecutors have 
brought charges against women who use drugs during pregnancy 
without demonstrating any harm to the fetus. 26° Moreover, a govern-
ment policy that has the effect of punishing primarily poor Black 
women for having babies evokes the specter of racial eugenics, espe-
cially in light of the history of sterilization abuse of women of color. 261 
These factors make clear that these women are not punished simply 
because they may harm their unborn children. They are punished 
because the combination of their poverty, race, and drug addiction is 
seen to make them unworthy of procreating. 
This aspect of the prosecutions implicates both equality and pri-
vacy interests. The right to bear children goes to the heart of what 
it means to be human. The value we place on individuals determines 
whether we see them as entitled to perpetuate themselves in their 
children. Denying someone the right to bear children - or punishing 
her for exercising that right - deprives her of a basic part of her 
humanity. 262 When this denial is based on race, it also functions to 
preserve a racial hierarchy that essentially disregards Black humanity. 
produce one's own children to rear." Scott, supra note 230, at 829. She argues that constitutional 
protection extends only to the reproductive interests of prospective rearing parents, because it 
is the objective of rearing the child that elevates the interest in procreation to the status of a 
fundamental right. The right to procreate, therefore, "requires an intention as well as an ability 
to assume the role of parent." I d. Thus, a retarded person who is "so severely and irremediably 
impaired that she could never provide a child with minimally adequate care . . has no 
[constitutionally] protectable interes t in proc reation." /d. at 833. The irremediable nature of the 
retarded person's impairment distinguishes her from a drug addict who is judged to be an unfit 
parent. Cf. id. at 833 n .g r (dist in guishing on the basis of irremediability retarded people from 
those who have previously failed at parenting). 
260 In the Johnson trial, for example, the prosecution introduced no evidence that Johnson's 
children were adversely affected by their mother's crack use. Indeed, there was testimony that 
the children were healthy and developing normally. See Trial Transcript, supra note 4, at 46-
47 , 120 (testimony of Dr. Randy T ompkin and Clarice Johnson, Jennifer's mother). A law 
proposed in Ohio makes drug use during pregnancy grounds for sterilization. S ee supra note 
2 r 7. Similarly, several states have enacted statutes that make a woman's drug use during 
pregnancy by itself grounds to depri ve h er of custody of her child. See supra note so. 
26 ! See supra pp. 1442-43. 
262 See Karst , supra note r6r , a t 32; Stefan, Who se Egg Is It Anyway? Reproductive Rights 
of Incarcerated, Institu tionali zed an d Incompetent Women, 13 N OVA L. REv. 405 , 454 (1989) 
(discussing the systematic barriers to motherhood imposed on incarcerated women as a part of 
th e process of dehumanization); see also Asch, R eproductive Technology and Disability, in 
REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE rggos, supra note 125 , at ro6-07 (discussi ng the importance of 
the right to choose childbearing for disabled women). 
I recognize that th ere are women who choose not to have children or are incapable of havin g 
children and that this choice or in a bility does not ma ke them any less human. Se e C ain, supra 
note 2 I , at 201, 205 n . 96 (criticizing feminist discourse that privileges the experience of moth-
erhood over other experiences of female connection). It is not the ac t of having children that 
makes an individual fully human ; it is society's view of whether she deserves to have children. 
DRUG-ADDICTED MOTHERS 1473 
The abuse of sterilization laws designed to effect eugenic policy 
demonstrates the potential danger of governmental standards for pro-
creation. During the first half of the twentieth century, the eugenics 
movement263 embraced the theory264 that intelligence and other per-
sonality traits are genetically determined and therefore inherited. This 
hereditarian belief, coupled with the reform approach of the progres-
sive era, fueled a campaign to remedy America's social problems by 
stemming biological degeneracy. Eugenicists advocated compulsory 
sterilization to prevent reproduction by people who were likely to 
produce allegedly defective offspring. Eugenic sterilization was 
thought to improve society by eliminating its "socially inadequate" 
members. 265 Many states around the turn of the century enacted 
involuntary sterilization laws directed at those deemed burdens on 
society, including the mentally retarded, mentally ill, epileptics, and 
criminals. 266 
In a r 92 7 decision, Buck 
the constitutionality268 of 
v. Bell, 267 the Supreme Court upheld 
a Virginia involuntary sterilization 
263 For a disc ussion of the eugenic sterilization movement in the early twentieth century, see 
Burgdorf & Burgdorf, Th e Wicked Witch Is Almost D ead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization 
of Handicapped Persons, so TEMP. L.Q. 995, 997-1005 (1977); and Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt 
Necessities" v. Fundamental Values? , 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 1418, 1425-35 (1981). George P. 
Smith II has presented a contemporary justification of eugenic sterilization of the mentally 
handicapped. Se e Smith, Limitations on Reproductive Autonomy for the Mentally Handicapped, 
4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 7I, 72, 88-89 (rg88). 
The discrediting of eugenic theory, the development of the constitutional doctrine of repro-
ductive autonomy, a nd the changing view of menta l retardation have all spurred a major reform 
of sterili za tion law in the last two decades. Reports of Nazi Germany's program of racial 
eugenics achieved through widespread sterilization precipitated the modern rej ection of these 
laws. S ee Scott, supra note 230, at Srr-12. 
264 For a description of th e origins of eugenic theo ry, see Cynkar, supra note 263, at 1420-
25. 
265 One report written by a leading sc holar of the eugenic movement defined the "socially 
inadequate" as: 
"(r) feeble-minded; (2) insane (including the psychopathic); (3) criminalistic (including the 
delinqu ent and wayward); (4) epil eptic; (5) inebriate (including dru g-habitues) ; (6) diseased 
(including the tuberc ulous, the syphilitic, the leprous , and others with chronic , infectious 
and legally segregable diseases); (7) blind (including those with seriously impaired vision); 
(8) deaf (including those with seriously impaired he arin g) ; (g) deformed (including the 
crippled); and (ro) dependent (including orphans , ne'er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps 
and paupers) . •· 
Cynkar, sup ra note 263, at 1428 (quoting H. LAUG HLIN , THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUGENICAL 
STERILIZATION 65 (1929)). 
266 As late as rg66, 26 states still had eugenic sterilization laws. See Scott, supra note 230, 
at 8og n . I I. It has been estimated that over jo ,ooo persons were in voluntarily sterilized under 
these statutes . See Smith, supra note 263, at 77 n 35. For a d isc ussion of the eugenic sterilization 
statutes, see Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit - I s S terilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 
59 1 (1966). 
267 274 U .S. zoo (1927). 
268 The Court rejected arguments that the Virginia steri lization law violated the equal 
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law. 269 The plaintiff, Carrie Buck, was described m the opinion as 
"a feeble minded white woman" committed to a state mental institu-
tion who was "the daughter of a feeble minded mother in the same 
institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble minded child. "2 70 
The Court approved an order of the mental institution that Buck 
undergo sterilization . Justice Holmes, himself an ardent eugenicist, 2 71 
gave eugenic theory the imprimatur of constitutional law in his infa-
mous declaration: "Three generations of imbeciles are enough. "2 72 
T he salient feature of the eugenic sterilization laws is their brutal 
imposition of society's restrictive norms of motherhood. Governmental 
control of reproduction in the name of science masks racist and classist 
judgments about who deserves to bear children. It is grounded on 
the premise that people who depart from social norms do not deserve 
to procreate . 27 3 Carrie Buck, for example, was punished by steriliza-
tion not because of any mental disability, but because of her deviance 
from society's social and sexual norms. 27 4 
protection clause because it a pplied only to in stitutionalized persons and th at it violated the due 
process clause because it exceeded the legitimate power of th e state. See id. at 20 7- 08. 
The continued a uthority of Buck v. B ell is highly do ubtful in light of the development of 
reprod uctive privacy doctrine in the last 30 years. Because ste rilization laws infringe what is 
now acknowledged as a fundamental right, they a re subject to strict scrutiny rather than the 
rational-basis a nalysis applied in Bell. See M urdock, Sterilizat ion of the R etarded: A Problem 
or a S olution?, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 917, 921-24 (1974); Sherlock & Sherlock, Sterilizing the 
Retarded: Constitutional, Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 6o N.C.L. REv. 943 , 953- 54 (1982). 
269 1924 Va. Acts 394 . For a disc ussion of the history of the Virginia sterilization law 's 
enactment , see Lombardo , Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell , 6o 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 30, 34-48 (rg8sl 
2iO Bell, 274 U.S. a: 205. Subsequent researc h has revealed that the Court's fac tual statement 
was erroneous. Although Carri e Buck became pregnant out of wedlock, the find in g that she 
was "feeble minded" was based on insubstant ia l testimony. See Gould, Carri .: Buck's Daughter, 
2 CONST. COMMENTARY 331, 336 (1985); Lombardo, supra note 269, at 52. 
2ii See H olmes , I de als and Doubts, ro I LL. L. REv. r, 3 (r915) ("I believe t hat the wholesale 
social regeneration . cannot be affec ted apprec iably by tin kering w ith the institution of 
property, but only by taking in han d life and trying to bu ild a race ."); Rogat, Mr. Justi ce 
Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 254, 282 ( r 963) (referring to Buck v. Bell as 
"a judicial manifestation of [Holmes's] intense eugenicist vic:ws"). 
27 2 Bell, 27 4 U.S. at 207. 
2i3 The distinction I make between punitive and eugenic motive does not depend on the 
specifi c provisions of the statute. but on the moralistic versus biological impulse underl yin g the 
statute . Compulsory steril ization laws - whether crimi nal or therape utic - 1vere often based 
on punitive motivations disg uised as a eugenic rationale. See R. PETCHESKY, supra note 235 , 
at 85. Petchesky asserts that th e steril ization laws were puni tive because "[t]heir aim was not 
only to reduce numbers or root out 'defective genes' but also to attack and p unish sexual 
'promiscuity' and the sexual dan ge r th ought to emanate from the lower classes , especially lo wer-
class women. " !d. at 88. My focus is on the statutes' punishment of deviance from the standard 
for motherhood rather tha n for sex ual deviance alor.e. 
2i 4 Apparently, Carrie was ste rilized because she was poor and had been pregnant out of 
wedlock. See Lomba rdo , supra note 269, at 5 r . The deposition testimony of the state mental 
institution's trial expert , the famed eugenicist Harry Laughli n, implies this underlying motiva-
tion: "These people belong to the shiftless, ignorant , and '.Vorthless ciass of anti -soc ial VV'hites of 
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Explanations of the eugenic rationale reveal this underlying moral 
standard for procreation. One eugenicist, for example, justified his 
extreme approach of putting the socially inadequate to death as "'the 
surest, the simplest, the kindest, and most humane means for pre-
venting reproduction among those whom we deem unworthy of the 
high privilege. '"275 Dr. Albert Priddy, the superintendent of the Vir-
ginia Colony, similarly explained the necessity of eugenic sterilization 
in one of his annual reports: the '"sexual immorality' of 'anti-social' 
'morons' rendered them 'wholly unfit for exercising the right of moth-
erhood. "'276 
Fourteen years after Buck v. Bell, the Court acknowledged the 
danger of the eugenic rationale. Justice Douglas recognized both the 
fundamental quality of the right to procreate and its connection to 
equality in a later sterilization decision, Skinner v. Oklahoma. 2 77 
Skinner considered the constitutionality of the Oklahoma Habitual 
Criminal Sterilization Act278 authorizing the sterilization of persons 
convicted two or more times for "felonies involving moral turpi-
tude. "279 An Oklahoma court had ordered Skinner to u!1dergo a 
vasectomy after he was convicted once of stealing chickens and twice 
of robbery with firearms. 280 The statute, the Court found, treated 
unequally criminals who had committed intrinsically the same quality 
of offense. For example, men who had committed grand larceny three 
times were sterilized, but embezzlers were not. The Court struck 
down the statute as a violation of the equal protection 
clause. Declaring the right to bear children to be "one of the basic 
civil rights of man, "281 the Court applied strict scrutiny to the 
classification282 and held that the government failed to demonstrate 
that the statute's classifications were justified by eugenics or the in-
heritability of criminal traits. 283 
Sl<-inner rested on grounds that linked equal protection doctrine 
and the right to procreate. Justice Douglas framed the legal question 
as "a sensitive and important area of human rights. "284 The reason 
the South." I d. After reviewing the record of the case, Professor Gould concluded: "Her case 
never was about mental deficiency; it was always a matter of sexual morality and social 
deviance. . Two generations of bastards are enough." Gould, supm note 2 70, at 336. 
275 M. HALLER, EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATTITUDES 1:--1 AMERICAN THOUGHT 42 (1963) 
(quoting eugenicist W. Duncan M cKim) (emphasis added). 
276 Lombardo, supra note 269, at 46 (quoting REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA STATE EPILEPTIC 
CoLONY 27 (1922-23)) (emphasis added). 
277 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
27 8 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ I?I-I95 (\Nest 1935). 
279 /d. § I/J. 
lSO See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 537· 
281 ld. at 54I. 
282 See id. at 541. 
283 See id. at 542. 
204 l d. a.t 536 (emphasis added). T he right of procreation is also considered a human right 
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for the Court's elevation of the right to procreate was the Court's 
recognition of the significant risk of discriminatory selection inherent 
in state intervention in reproduction. 285 The Court also understood 
the genocidal implications of a government standard for procreation: 
"In evil or reckless hands [the government's power to sterilize] can 
cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to 
wither and disappear. "286 The critical role of procreation to human 
survival and the invidious potential for government discrimination 
against disfavored groups makes heightened protection crucial. The 
Court understood the use of the power to sterilize in the government's 
discrimination against certain types of criminals to be as invidious "as 
if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treat-
ment. "287 
Although the reasons advanced for the sterilization of chicken 
thieves and the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers are different, 
both practices are dangerous for similar reasons. Both effectuate 
ethnocentric judgments by the government that certain members of 
society do not deserve to have children. As the Court recognized in 
Skinner, the enforcement of a government standard for childbearing 
denies the disfavored group a critical aspect of human dignity. 288 
The history of compulsory sterilization demonstrates that society 
deems women who deviate from its norms of motherhood- in 1941, 
teenaged delinquent girls like Carrie Buck who bore illegitimate chil-
dren, today, poor Black crack addicts who use drugs during pregnancy 
-"unworthy of the high privilege" of procreation. 289 The government 
therefore refuses to affirm their human dignity by helping them over-
come obstacles to good mothering. 290 Rather, it punishes them by 
sterilization or criminal prosecution and thereby denies them a basic 
part of their humanity. When this denial is based on race, the vio-
lation is especially serious . Governmental policies that perpetuate 
racial subordination through the denial of procreative rights, which 
threaten both racial equality and privacy at once, should be subject 
to the highest scrutiny. 
E. Toward a New Privacy Jurisprudence 
Imagine that courts and legislatures have accepted the argument 
tha t the prosecution of crack-addicted mothers violates their right of 
under international law. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 16 § r, G.A. Res. 
21 7 (III ), a t 74, U.N. Doc. A/8ro (1948) ("Men and women of full age, without any limitation 
due to race, nationality or religion , have the right to marry and to found a family."). 
28 5 See L. TRIBE , supra note r64, § rs-ro, at 133 9, § 16-12, at 1464. 
285 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 54 1. 
28i / d . 
288 See id. 
28 9 See supra note 275 and ac companying text. 
290 See supra notes pp. 1448- s o. 
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privacy. All pending indictments for drug use during pregnancy are 
dismissed and bills proposing fetal abuse laws are discarded. Would 
there be any perceptible change in the inferior status of Black women? 
Pregnant crack addicts would still be denied treatment, and most poor 
Black women would continue to receive inadequate prenatal care . 
The infant mortality rate for Blacks would remain deplorably high. 
In spite of the benefits of privacy doctrine for women of color, liberal 
notions of privacy are inadequate to eliminate the subordination of 
Black women. In this section, I will suggest two approaches that I 
believe are necessary in order for privacy theory to contribute to the 
eradication of racial hierarchy. First, we need to develop a positive 
view of the right of privacy. Second, the law must recognize the 
connection between the right of privacy and racial equality. 
The most compelling argument against privacy rhetoric, from the 
perspective of women of color, is the connection that feminist scholars 
have drawn between privacy and the abortion funding 
decisions. 29 1 Critics of the concept of privacy note that framing the 
abortion right as a right merely to be shielded from state intrusion 
into private choices provides no basis for a constitutional claim to 
public support for abortions. As the Court explained in Harris v. 
J11cRae, 292 "although government may not place obstacles in the path 
of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove 
those not of its own creation. "293 MacKinnon concludes that abortion 
as a private privilege rather than a public right only serves to per-
petuate inequality: 
Privacy conceived as a right from public intervention and disclosure 
is the opposite of the relief that Harris sought for welfare women. 
State intervention would have provided a choice women did not have 
in [the] private [realm]. T he women in Harris, women whose sexual 
refusal has counted for particularly little, needed something to make 
their privacy effective. The logic of the Court's response resembles 
the logic by which women are supposed to consent to sex. Preclude 
the alternatives, then call the sole remaining option "her choice." The 
point is that the alternatives are precluded prior to the reach of the 
chosen legal doctrine. They are precluded by conditions of sex, race, 
and class - the very conditions the privacy frame not only leaves 
tacit but exists to guarantee. 294 
This critique is correct in its observation that the power of privacy 
doctrine in poor women's lives is constrained by liberal notions of 
291 S ee supm notes 213 & 240. 
292 44 8 U.S. 297 (1980). 
293 !d . at 316. 
294 C . MACKI NNON, supra note r9 , at 101 (emphasis in origina l). Rhonda Copelon and 
Rosalind Petchesky draw similar conclusions about the limits of liberal privacy theory in the 
abortion fun ding context. SeeR. PETCHESKY , supra note 235, at 295-302; Copelon , supra note 
251, at 322-25 . 
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freedom. First, the abstract freedom to choose is of meager value 
without meaningful options from which to choose and the ability to 
effectuate one's choice . 295 The traditional concept of privacy makes 
the false presumption that the right to choose is contained entirely 
within the individual and not circumscribed by the material conditions 
of the individual's life . 296 Second, the abstract freedom of self-defi-
nition is of little help to someone who lacks the resources to realize 
the personality she envisions or whose emergent self is continually 
beaten down by social forces . Defining the guarantee of personhood 
as no more than shielding a sphere of personal decisions from the 
reach of government - merely ensuring the individual's "right to be 
let alone" - may be inadequate to protect the dignity and autonomy 
of the poor and oppressed. 2 97 
The definition of privacy as a purely negative right serves to 
exempt the state from any obligation to ensure the social conditions 
and resources necessary for self-determination and autonomous deci-
sionmaking. 298 Based on this narrow view of liberty, the Supreme 
295 See supra note 2 I r. Dependence on public largesse, fo r example, means that the gov-
ernm ent can determine which reproductive decisions indige nt women may carry out. The 
Supreme Court erroneously reasoned in the abortion fundin g decisions that the denial of public 
fu nding imposes no new obstacle to reproductive choice. If a n ind igent woman is unable to 
effec tuate her decision to have an abortion , the Court argued , her inability is due to her poverty 
and not the government's funding policy. See Maher v. Roe , 432 U.S. 464, 4 74 (I977l; Harris, 
448 U .S. at 3!4-I S. But the Court 's reasoning ignores the real-life effect of the government's 
fundin g choices on poor women . An indigent woman w ho is unable to pay for either childbirth 
or abortion has no choice but to accept the government 's determination. By funding only one 
option , the gove rnment has really made the woman's choice for her. See Binion, supra note 
230, at I9; Goldstein, A Critique of the Abort ion Funding Decisions: On Private Rights in the 
Public Sector, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 3I3, 3IS-I7 (I98I); Tribe, The Abortion Funding 
Conundnmz: Inalienable Rights, Af.finnative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. 
L. REv. 330, 336-37 (I98S). 
296 See R. PETCHESKY , supra note 235, at 295-302 ; Copelan, supra note zsr , at 322- 23. 
297 Thomas Grey notes the distin ction between the civ il rights and civil liberties perceptions 
of the personality: "The former tend to see the personali ty as more socially-constructed , hen ce 
soc ially destructible ; the latte r see it as more naturally self-re liant and au tonomous. " T. Grey, 
C iv il Righ ts vs. Civil Liberties: The Case of Discrimina tory Ve rbal Harassment I-2 (Mar. I 990) 
(un published manuscript on file at the H a rvard Law School Library); see also Colker, supra 
note r3o, at ror9- 2 I (describing a group-based and individual-based concept of the "authentic 
self "). While relying on the right to individual autonomy, I am suggesting that the legal doctrine 
that protects it should adopt what Professor Grey calls th e civil ri ghts perspective of personh ood. 
T his concept of autonomy protects the right to make certain choices but recognizes that choices 
a re made in the context of a community and in relation to others. See T. Grey, supra, at I . I 
also recognize that the individual's pe rsonhood may be denied as a means of attacking the 
communi ty as a whole and that the co mmunity's sup port may be necessary for nurtu rin g the 
individual's personhood. I do not be lieve that the recognit ion of these connections betwee n the 
individua l and the community are inhere ntly inconsistent with the notion of autonomy. 
298 See Copelon, supra note 251 , a t 323. For a thorough cri tiq ue of the prevailing conception 
of th e Constitution as solely a charter of negative liberties, see Bandes , The Negative Con sti -
tution: A Critique. 88 MI CH. L. REv. 227r ( r990). 
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Court has denied a variety of claims to government aid. 299 Mac-
Kinnon notes that "[i]t is apparently a very short step from that which 
the government has a duty not to intervene in to that which it has 
no duty to intervene in. "300 An evolving privacy doctrine need not 
make the step between these two propositions. Laurence Tribe, for 
example, has suggested an alternative view of the relationship between 
the government's negative and affirmative responsibilities in guaran-
teeing the rights of personhood: "Ultimately, the affirmative duties of 
government cannot be severed from its obligations to refrain from 
certain forms of control; both must respond to a substantive vision of 
the needs of human personality. "301 
This concept of privacy includes not only the negative proscription 
against government coercion, but also the affirmative duty of govern-
ment to protect the individual's personhood from degradation and to 
facilitate the processes of choice and self-determination. 302 This ap-
proach shifts the focus of privacy theory from state nonintervention 
to an affirmative guarantee of personhood and autonomy. Under this 
post-liberal doctrine, the government is not only prohibited from pun-
ishing crack-addicted women for choosing to bear children; it is also 
required to provide drug treatment and prenatal care. Robin West 
has eloquently captured this progressive understanding of the due 
299 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 
(1989) ("(O]ur cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative 
right to governmental aid , even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or 
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual."). 
300 C. MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 96 (emphasis in original); see also Copelan, supra note 
251, at 316 (observing the "sharp tension between the liberal idea of privacy as the negative 
and qualified right to be let alone as long as nothing too significant is at stake and the more 
radical idea of privacy as an affirmative liberty of self-determination and an aspect of equal 
personhood"); West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, supra note 14, at 646-47 
("(P]rogressives tend to support an 'affirmative' understanding of the liberty protected by the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment . while conservatives read the clause as 
protecting 'negative liberty' only, i.e., the right to be free from certain defined interferences."). 
301 L. TRIBE, supra note r64, § 15-2, at 1305. 
3° 2 Clearly the affirmative guarantee of personhood and autonomy must have boundaries. 
'vVe cannot expect the government to provide every means necessary to fulfill each individual's 
sense of identity. Moreover, increased government involvement in the processes of individual 
choice and self-determination may create new dangers. Finally, there may be advantages to 
using privacy doctrine to protect against the government's abuse of power and using other 
concepts, such as equality, to achieve more affirmative goals. It is beyond the scope of this 
Article to explore all of the questions raised by the new privacy jurisprudence. My point here 
is to acknowledge the limitations of current privacy doctrine and to suggest the ingredients of 
a doctrine that overcomes them. Others have explored the scope of the positive role of govern-
ment in correcting material inequalities. See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term 
- Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 
7, 9-13 (1969) (proposing a vision of social justice in which citizens are entitled to "minimum 
protection against economic hazard"); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New 
Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 
1090-96 ( r 97 7) (interpreting National League of Cities as a recognition of affirmative rights). 
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process clause in which privacy doctrine is grounded: "The ideal of 
due process, then, is an individual life free of illegitimate social coer-
cion facilitated by hierarchies of class, gender, or race. The goal is 
an affirmatively autonomous existence: a meaningfully flourishing, 
independent, enriched individual life. "303 
This affirmative view of privacy is enhanced by recognizing the 
connection between privacy and racial equality. The government's 
duty to guarantee personhood and autonomy stems not only from the 
needs of the individual , but also from the needs of the entire com-
munity. The harm caused by the prosecution of crack-addicted moth-
ers is not simply the incursion on each individual crack addict's de-
cisionmaking; it is the perpetuation of a degraded image that affects 
the status of an entire race. The devaluation of a poor Black addict's 
decision to bear a child is tied to the dominant society's disregard for 
the motherhood of all Black women. The diminished value placed 
on Black motherhood , in turn, is a badge of racial inferiority worn 
by all Black people . The affirmative view of privacy recognizes the 
connection between the dehumanization of the individual and the 
subordination of the group . 
Thus, the reason that legislatures should reject laws that punish 
Black women's reproductive choices is not an absolute and isolated 
notion of individual autonomy. Rather, legislatures should reject these 
laws as a critical step towards eradicating a racial hierarchy that has 
historically demeaned Black motherhood . Respecting Black women 's 
decision to bear children is a necessary ingredient of a community 
that affirms the personhood of all of its members . T he right to 
reproductive autonomy is in this way linked to the goal of racial 
equality and the broader pursuit of a just society. This broader di-
mension of privacy's guarantees provides a stronger claim to govern-
ment's affirmative responsibilities. 
Feminist legal theory, with its emphasis on the law's concrete effect 
on the condition of women, calls for a reassessment of traditional 
privacy law. It may be possible , however, to reconstruct a privacy 
jurisprudence that retains the focus on autonomy and personhood 
while making privacy doctrine effective. 304 Before dismissing the right 
of privacy altogether, we should explore ways to give the concepts of 
303 \Vest, Progressive and C onsen;ative Constitutionalism , supra note 14, at 707. 
3°4 The word "privacy" may be too imbued with limiting liberal interpretation to be a useful 
desc riptive term. "Privacy" co nnotes shielding from intrusion and thus may be sui tab le to 
desc ribe solely the negati ve prosc ri ption against gove rnment ac tion . l\1oreover, the word con-
jures up the public-private d ichoto my. "Li berty," on th e other ha nd , has more potentia l to 
include the a ffirmati ve duty of gove rnment to ensure the co nd itions necessary for au to nomy and 
self-defini tion. In reco nstructing the consti tutio nal gua ra ntees I have been disc ussing, it may 
be more appropri a te to re ly on the broader concep t of "li be rty. " See A. A LLE N, supra note r6o, 
at gS-r o r (discussing th e d ifferences be tween "liberty" and "privacy") . 
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choice and personhood more substance. 305 In this way, the continuing 
process of challenge and subversion306 - the feminist critique of 
liberal privacy doctrine, followed by the racial critique of the feminist 
analysis - will forge a finer legal tool for dismantling institutions of 
domination. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Our understanding of the prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers 
must include the perspective of the women whom they most directly 
affect. The prosecutions arise in a particular historical and political 
context that has constrained reproductive choice for poor women of 
color. The state's decision to punish drug-addicted mothers rather 
than help them stems from the poverty and race of the defendants 
and society's denial of their full dignity as human beings. Viewing 
the issue from their vantage point reveals that the prosecutions punish 
for having babies women whose motherhood has historically been 
devalued. 
A policy that attempts to protect fetuses by denying the humanity 
of their mothers will inevitably fail. 307 We must question such a 
policy's true concern for the dignity of the fetus, just as we question 
the motives of the slave owner who protected the unborn slave child 
while whipping his pregnant mother. Although the master attempted 
to separate the mother and fetus for his commercial ends, their fates 
were inextricably intertwined. The tragedy of crack babies is initially 
a tragedy of crack-addicted mothers. Both are part of a larger tragedy 
of a community that is suffering a host of indignities, including, 
significantly, the denial of equal respect for its women's reproductive 
decisions. 
It is only by affirming the personhood and equality of poor women 
of color that the survival of their future generation will be ensured. 
305 In answering the critical legal studies' critique of rights, Patricia Williams notes that 
oppression is the result not of "rights-assertion," but of a failure of "rights-
commitment." Williams, supra note 243, at 424 (emphasis in original). In the same way, the 
concepts of choice, personhood, and autonomy that are central to privacy doctrine are not 
inherently oppressive, any more than is the concept of equality (which has also been interpreted 
in ways that perpetuate hierarchy and domination). It is the "constricted referential universe," 
id. at 424, of liberal notions - such as negative rights, neutral principles, the public-private 
dichotomy, and formal equality - that have limited privacy's usefulness for attaining repro-
ductive freedom. See Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 334-35 (1987) (demonstrating how women and people of 
color can adopt and transform constitutional text for radical objectives). 
306 See supra p. 1464. 
30i I hear this false dichotomy in the words of Muskegon, Michigan, narcotics officer AI Van 
Hemert: '"If the mother wants to smoke crack and kill herself, I don't care.· . 'Let her die, 
but don't take that poor baby with her."' Hoffman, supra note 5, at 34 
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The first principle of the government's response to the crisis of drug-
exposed babies should be the recognition of their mothers' worth and 
entitlement to autonomy over their reproductive lives. A commitment 
to guaranteeing these fundamental rights of poor women of color, 
rather than punishing them, is the true solution to the problem of 
unhealthy babies . 
